Schedule of Panels

Session 1

June 26, 10:30-12:30

Panel A

Elizabeth VanderVen
“Changing Times: State and Village Negotiation over the School Calendar, Haicheng County, Northeast China, 1904-1931”
University of Chicago
evanderv@uchicago.edu

Xiaoping Cong
“An Overlapped State and Society and a Merged Public Sphere: A View on the Data of Local Educational Officials in Early Republican China”
University of Houston
xcong@uh.edu

Elizabeth Littell-Lamb
“Negotiating a Space of Their Own: Women’s Institutions and the ‘Female Public Sphere’ in early Republican China”
St. Bonaventure University
elittell@sbu.edu

Helen Schneider
“Domestic Managers as Political Actors: Home Economics Education and Women’s Social Responsibilities in Republican China”
Virginia Tech
hms@vt.edu

R. Keith Schoppa
Discussant
Loyola College in Maryland
kschoppa@loyola.edu

Panel B

Wai Chor So
The Mongolia Issue in Republican China, 1912-1937: Ethnicity and Integration
Open University of Hong Kong
Hideo Fukamachi
Chuo University, Tokyo
yupingz@sbcglobal.net

Margherita Zanasi 曾瑪莉
Economic Nationalism and the Construction of Political Legitimacy in Twentieth-Century China
Louisiana State University 路易斯安那州大學
mzanasi@uts.cc.utexas.edu

Wang Gungwu
Discussant
East Asian Institute, NUS
eaiwgw@nus.edu.sg

Session 2
June 26, 1:30-3:30

Panel A

Frangville Vanessa
The Ethnic Classification Project within Ideological and Political Strategies
Jean Moulin University of Lyon 3
vanessafrangville@hotmail.com

Zeng Chenggui
A Historical Exploration on the Ethnic Policy Made by CPC: from ethnic self-decision to ethnic regional autonomy
Hubei Academy of Social Sciences
zengchenggui@hbsky58.net

Bin Yang
Ethnic Identification in Yunnan: Identifying into the Chinese Nationality Family
National University of Singapore
hisyang@nus.edu.sg

James Leibold
A Singular or Plural Nation? Competing Narratives of Racial Identity in Wartime China, 1937-1945
Yan Hao
Discussant
East Asian Institute/ China National Development and Reform Commission
eaiyh@nus.edu.sg

Panel B

Ke-wen Wang
Zhang Jiluan, the Daogongbao, and Sino-Japanese War, 1937-41
Saint Michael's College
kwang@smcvt.edu

Kwan Man Bun
Patriotism and Private Enterprise: Jiuda Salt Industries in the Second World War
University of Cincinnati
kwanmb@uc.edu

Kubo Toru
Nation-state Building Effort by Guomindang and Financial Technocrats, 1928-1937
Shinshu University
tkmst@tcn-catv.ne.jp

Elisabeth Köll
Railroad Guerillas, Labor Activists and Smugglers: Nationalism and Resistance along the JinPu Line, 1937 to 1949
Case Western Reserve University
elisabeth.koll@case.edu

Lincoln Li
Discussant
Monash University/Aichi Bunkyo University
Lincoln.Li@arts.monash.edu.au

Session 3
June 26, 4:00-6:00

Panel A
Jiang Na
Wu Leichuan and the Registration Exercise of Yenching University to the Beijing government in the 1920s
Asia Research Institute, NUS
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Jin FENG
Training Her Body for God and For China -- The Development of Physical Education at Ginling College
Grinnell College
fengjin@grinnell.edu

James Carter
Travels of Tan Xu: Buddhism and Nationalism in 20th-Century China
St. Joseph’s University
jcarter@sju.edu

Thomas DuBois
Japan and Religion in Manchukuo - Perceptions and Policies
National University of Singapore
histdd@nus.edu.sg

James Carter
Discussant
St. Joseph’s University
jcarter@sju.edu

Panel B

Limin Bai
Chinese Perceptions of the World and Races: An Analysis of a Republican Textbook
Chinese Geography
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
limin.bai@vuw.ac.nz

Li Ziyuan
西方多民族国家的自治立法与中国的民族法治建设研究 (Study on establishment law for self-governance in Western multiethnic societies and legal minority governance in China)
中南民族大学 Southern-Central Nationalities University
liziyuan448@yahoo.com.cn

田子渝 Tian Ziyu
台湾民族主义与中华民族主义论文摘要 (Racial thought in Taiwan and mainland China)
湖北大学 Hubei University
ziyut1@sina.com
Session 4
June 27, 9:30-12:00

Panel A

Yixin Chen
From Great Scheme to Great Disaster: Cases of Anhui and Jiangxi in the Great Leap Forward Famine
University of North Carolina Wilmington
cheny@uncw.edu

Linsun Cheng
A painful and expensive transition—the take over and reorganization of China’s industries in early 1950s
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth
lcheng@umassd.edu

Shiwei Chen
History in Three Mobilizations: A Reexamination of the Chinese Biological Warfare Allegations against the U.S. in the Korean War
Lake Forest College/Asia Research Institute, NUS
chen@lakeforest.edu

Dayong Niu
China’s Nuclear Developments and American Reactions in the Early 1960’s.
Beijing University
ndy@pku.edu.cn

Xiaowu Hu
The National Power and Urban Social Structure Change in the Maoist Period (1949—1976)
Nanjing University
urbanobserver@163.com

Parks M. Coble
Discussant
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
pcoble@unlnotes.unl.edu
Panel B

Stephen R. Platt
“Hunanese Nationalism”
University of Massachusetts Amherst
platt@history.umass.edu

Zheng Yangwen
Hunan: Laboratory of Reform and Land of Revolution
Asia Research Institute, NUS
arizyw@nus.edu.sg

Ong Chang Woei
Building a New Chinese State from the Northwest: The Proposal of Liu Guangfen (1843-1903)
National University of Singapore
chsongcw@nus.edu.sg

Chi Zhen
Bleeding Heads and Muddied Hands: The Local Self-government of Wanxi
National University of Singapore/Nankai University
g0305726@nus.edu.sg

May-bo Ching
When Shanghai meets Guangdong: The Shanghai elements in the evolution of Cantonese music in the 1920s and 30s
Sun Yat-sen University
chengmb@mail.sysu.edu.cn

Thomas DuBois
Discussant
National University of Singapore
histdd@nus.edu.sg

Session 5
June 27, 1:00-3:00

Panel A

Charles A. Keller
Xuesheng yundong: Chinese “Christian” Students, YMCAs, and NGOs in
Republican China
Southern Arkansas University
cakeller@saumag.edu

Xiao-huang Yin
The Interface of the Global and the Local: A Study of Transnational Organizations Founded by PRC Immigrants in America
Occidental College
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A. Tom Grunfeld
Civil Society and NGOs in China
Empire State College/State University of New York
tom.grunfeld@esc.edu

Ren Yunlan
Local Elite and Charities: a Case Study of Modern Tianjin 地方精英与慈善事业：
近代天津的个案研究
Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences
renyl2004@eyou.com or renyunlan@tom.com

Elspeth Thomson
Discussant
East Asian Institute
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Panel B

Dong WANG
China Interacts with the World: Unequal Treaties, Imperialism, and Nationalism
Gordon College; Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University
dong.wang@gordon.edu

Haiming Liu
Chinese Exclusion Laws and U.S.-China Relationship
California State Polytechnic University
Hliu1@csupomona.edu
Chen Hongmin

The Decline of Chinese Suzerainty over Korea: The Case of the 1887 Korean Mission to the United States
Zhejiang University
njhmchen@hotmail.com

Zhang Leiping
Trade between Qing in China and Nguyen in Vietnam in 19th century
National University of Singapore
g0305800@nus.edu.sg

Teow See Heng
Discussant
National University of Singapore
histsh@nus.edu.sg

Session 6
June 27, 3:30-5:30

Panel A

Ka-che Yip
New Army Doctors for a New China: The Central Military Medical School during the Sino-Japanese War
University of Maryland Baltimore County
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Odoric Y.K. Wou
National Salvation and Early Wartime Mobilization of the Red Spears in Henan
Rutgers University/ Newark
owou@juno.com

Huaiyin Li
State Discourse and Village Politics in Early Twentieth-Century North China:
Evidence from Huailu County, Hebei Province
University of Missouri-Columbia
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Joseph Tse-Hei Lee
Religion and Modern State: The Three-Self Patriotic Movement in South China during the Maoist era
Pace University, New York
jlee980@nyc.rr.com

David Pong
Discussant
University of Delaware
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Panel B
Elena Barabantseva
‘Domestic Cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Ethnic Internationalism’ in China’s Socialist Nation-Building
University of Manchester
leba16@yahoo.com

Steven Phillips
Mothers of the Revolution: The Nationalists and Huaqiao Mobilization during the 1950s
Towson University
sphillip@towson.edu

Huei-ying Kuo
Divided Chinese Communities in United Homeland Ties: Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor
State University of New York at Binghamton
hkuo@binghamton.edu

Huang Jianli
Dynamics at the Periphery of the Chinese Nation:
National University of Singapore
hishjl@nus.edu.sg
Historiography on Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution

Dong WANG
Discussant
Gordon College; Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University
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Session 7

June 28, 9:30-11:30

Panel A

Jianhua Chen
Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Popular Culture: Zhou Shoujuan’s Love Stories in Shanghai in the 1910s-1920s
The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
hmjjchen@ust.hk

Qian Suoqiao
Imperialism, Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism and the Liberal Difference
Yung-chen Chiang
“Above All Nations Is Humanity”: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Hu Shi (1891-1962)
DePauw University
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KAWAJIRI Fumihiko
Modern China and Du Contrat social: How did Chinese intellectuals understand Du Contrat social
Tezukayama Gakuin University
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Yung-chen Chiang
Discussant
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Panel B

Parks M. Coble
China at War, 1937-1945: Remembering and Re-remembering China’s War of Resistance
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
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Yu SHEN
‘Let History Serve the Present’: Bases of Patriotic Education in China.
Indiana University Southeast
yshen@ius.edu

Tong Lam
The Politics of Cultural Heritage: Imagining the Colonial Past and Global Future in Post-Socialist China
University of Toronto
tong.lam@utoronto.ca

Brian Moloughney
Good and Popular History: Rewriting the nation’s story
University of Otago
brian.moloughney@stonebow.otago.ac.nz

Margherita Zanasi 曾珮莉
Session 8

June 28, 12:30-2:30

Panel A

Pan Xiaoxia
The Bankruptcy Mechanism of the Chinese Traditional Financial Institution: A Study of Qianzhuang and Pianhao bankruptcy in late Qing Dynasty and early Republic
Nanjing University
junlixia@sina.com

Wang Luman
New Perspectives on the rise and decline of Shanxi piaohao
National University of Singapore
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Elisabeth Köll
Discussant
Case Western University
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Panel B

Zhou Lei
Nation, Party and Women – Research into the New Life Movement in the Women’s Sphere (1934-1945)
Nanjing University
shuyu111924@163.com

Song Shaopeng
Nationalism and Feminism: Constructing of Female Individual Citizenship and building of Image of Nation-Station in early modern China
Renmin University
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Greg Rohlf
“Resettlement of Women and State Building in Western China”
University of the Pacific
Session 9

June 28, 4:00-6:00

Panel A

Yinghong Cheng
Maoism and Castroism: A Comparison from Global Perspective
Delaware State University
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Nicolai VOLLAND
Translating the Socialist State: Translators, National Identity, and the Socialist World in the Early PRC
Academia Sinica
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Dooeum CHUNG
Investment in China by South Koreans in Perspective
Korea Study Centre, Zhejiang University
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Dora Martins
Chinese Foreign Policy to East Asia: current driving forces
Technical University of Lisbon (Social and Political Sciences Faculty)
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Bi Jianhai
Discussant
East Asian Institute / Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
eaibj@nus.edu.sg
Panel A

“Beyond Habermas: Theorizing Relations between State and Society in Early Twentieth Century China”

Elizabeth VanderVen

“Changing Times: State and Village Negotiation over the School Calendar, Haicheng County, Northeast China, 1904-1931”

In this paper, Elizabeth VanderVen analyzes the implementation of a state-mandated school calendar in village primary schools across Haicheng County, Northeast China, from 1904-1931. Prior to the early 20th century, most primary schools operated according to flexible notions of time; there were no official days or hours of operation. Furthermore, because the Confucian-based education revolved around the needs of the individual, students proceeded at different paces. After 1904, when the Qing replaced the civil examinations with an entirely new school system, schools were required to adhere to a strict calendar. School time became highly regulated and compartmentalized; all students were to begin identical courses of study on the same day, for the same number of years, and for the same number of hours per week. When compared to the flexibility and irregularity of the past, the new calendar appeared as a significant change.

Past works, analyzing the new school calendar by relying on binary models such as cooperation-resistance, state-society, and traditional/modern, have exaggerated the degree of this change. These works conclude that the new calendar collided with rural notions of time resulting in tension, hostility, and local resistance to the new schools. VanderVen challenges this picture by showing how a multitude of actors including the central government, county administrative offices, and the villagers themselves, created a contested space in which they resisted, cooperated, and ultimately negotiated over the articulation of time. She concludes that – on multiple levels - the new calendar was introduced in a manner far more harmonious than past works have allowed. To that end, the overlap between state and societal elements was so significant that neither was ever completely autonomous from the other. VanderVen’s discussion of how the needs and exigencies of the locality informed the Qing Ministry of Education’s (one face of the state) very design of the new school calendar, reveals that the center could appropriate local cultures and not just the other way around. VanderVen also shows how county-level officials (another face of the “state”), many of who came from Haicheng’s villages themselves, strove to adjust the calendar at the local level so that it would appeal to the village communities. The villagers themselves inscribed local symbols and practices onto the calendar in a manner that was
simultaneously subversive and cooperative. The result was that new and rigid notions of time were meshed with familiar and flexible notions of time into something workable and meaningful for all involved.

By taking such an approach, VanderVen makes the broader argument that the Chinese path to modernization was not a straightforward one by which local loyalties were ultimately subsumed by the exigencies of the nation-state. Modernity was ultimately articulated and played out in the space where the center and the local met and overlapped.

Xiaoping Cong

“An Overlapped State and Society and a Merged Public Sphere: A View on the Data of Local Educational Officials in Early Republican China”

a nuanced analysis of local elite’s involvement in education at provincial and county levels, Xiaoping Cong argues that “society” in fact was not a force outside of the “state,” opposed to state power; instead, data shows that there was an overlapped state and society in the local educational field in the early Republican period. The activities of these local elites and local educational associations have been the focus of many scholarly works on understanding the dynamics of state and society. We seem to have some idea about local elites. Based on the regulations of local educational associations, they had either “traditional” or modern schooling and were actively engaged in the field of education during this period. However, the so-called “state,” which was represented by provincial and county bureaucratic organs such as provincial “education bureaus” and county “educational exhortation offices,” very often had vague faces. In her paper, Cong displays a large amount of data from the “Official Bulletin of the ministry of education (Jiaoyu bu gongbao)” from 1917-1923, which contains the short resumes of over a thousand education officials from nineteen provinces, the capital region, and numerous counties. These resumes include the officials’ names, native places, and official titles; their educational backgrounds and work history in the field of education; and the positions they had held. The great majority of these educational officials had teaching experience and many of them were former heads of local education associations. This data revealed the face of “state” represented at local educational field and those who were involved in teaching, activities of educational associations, and governmental educational bureaus were very often the same group of people. The members of local education associations, educational administrators, and teachers were in fact overlapped and their identity as representative of “state” and “society” were shifting based on the opportunity they might have. Therefore, with this new face of the “state,” it is necessary to reevaluate the boundary between “state” and “society” and the realm between them.

Elizabeth Littell-Lamb

“Negotiating a Space of Their Own: Women’s Institutions and the ‘Female Public Sphere’ in early Republican China”
Scholars of early modern China such as Dorothy Ko and Susan Mann suggest that there was a political continuum from the inner quarters to the court because as wives and mothers women directly served the state. The elimination of the civil service examination system and the introduction of Western-style political institutions fundamentally altered both literati society and the bureaucratic state. Wen-hsin Yeh wrote of disjuncture this caused elite men in The Alienated Academy. But what of elite women? While the Confucian rational for confining women to the inner quarters no longer existed, late Qing reformers and Republican era politicians continued to valorize traditional female roles as foundational in their state-building program. Some women continued to prioritize their roles as wives and mothers but used “maternal feminism” to enter public life as socially-minded reformers. Other women, however, rejected these roles, choosing independence and careers over marriage.

Elizabeth Littell-Lamb argues that any discussion of the relationship between state and society in early twentieth century China must include an analysis of gender and class. However Habermas’ “civil society and public sphere” is reworked, including Philip Huang’s conceptualization of a “middle realm” that mediated relations between state and society, most new public spaces remained the domain of elite men and marginalized women. To this end, women created new, female-only spaces, including women’s college, women’s associations and the female press, that formed a “female public sphere” distinct from both the male-dominated state-building process and the male-dominated “middle realm” of politics and commerce. The “female public sphere” thus linked the public worlds of women to these public worlds of men. Littell-Lamb further argues that the “female public sphere” not only mediated relations among multiple public spheres but were sites that gave women the autonomy women to work new class and gender identities, to create and to legitimate new roles outside the bounds of family and kinship and to negotiate a new relationships with the state.

Helen Schneider

“Domestic Managers as Political Actors: Home Economics Education and Women’s Social Responsibilities in Republican China”

In her piece, Helen Schneider argues that the discipline of home economics bridged the perceived divide between the public space of overt political action and the private space of family relations in the home. For historians, “domesticity” has classically implied that home and family are separate from the state, and that as the domain of women the home is marginal to how the state is ruled and how society changes. In China, while there may have been physical and rhetorical barriers between the “inside” and the “outside,” or between “public” and “private,” political thinkers did see the management of the family as fundamental to the ruling of the state. Building on the assumption that a well-managed home was the cornerstone of a stable state, many intellectuals of the Republican period, male and female alike, believed that if practical changes were made in Chinese homes, then the nation would be stronger. Intellectuals such as journalists, academics, or civil servants felt that women’s responsibilities in the realm of the home had to undergo
dramatic reformulations to improve the quality of the nation’s families. Schneider looks at the development of educational programs in institutions of higher learning, the discipline of jiazheng (home economics or home management) that were intended to foster these national improvements.

While at first glance it may appear that home economics was training women to solely act as managers of individual family homes, in fact the discipline as it operated in schools of higher learning presented a whole set of new opportunities to women by providing them with new kinds of skills that they could leverage well beyond the home as it has been traditionally understood. Negotiating a rhetorical space between the state and the family, home economists in Republican China used the instability of meanings and the questioning of appropriate rules relating to the home to create new professional opportunities for women. Schneider interprets the field of home economics as one of disciplinary potentials; covering courses as wide-ranging as child psychology to organic chemistry, the field provided a wide set of new, scientific, skills. By the 1920s, home economists were trained for careers such as nutritionists, nurses, teachers, and social workers. The field therefore served to create a class of trained women with managerial skills and specialized knowledge who worked as agents of national development and national strengthening. The paper outlines the development of home economics by looking at educational institutions, intellectual idealizations about the field, and the experiences and careers of home economists. It furthermore discusses the ways that home economists felt themselves to be part of a discipline capable of bridging the gaps between state, society, and their own domestic spaces.

Panel B

Rethinking Identity and Legitimacy in the Nation-Building Process of 20th-Century China (I)

Wai Chor So

“The Mongolia Issue in Republican China, 1912-1937: Ethnicity and Integration.”

This is a paper about the changing relationships between the Chinese Republican government and the Mongolian region (both Outer and Inner Mongolia) during 1912-1937. After the 1911 Revolution, the Mongolians declared their independence from China. Ethnical differences between the Han people and the Mongolia people obviously came into play in the Mongolian independence and in the ensuing political struggles in the region. Outer Mongolia was subsequently detached from China, while Inner Mongolia was to remain part of Chinese territories during the Republican period. The paper will examine the policies carried out by successive Chinese Republican governments to integrate the Mongolians into the Chinese nation and how politics at the time shaped the outcome of the integration.

Hideo Fukamachi

Chinese politics in the late 1910s is usually portrayed as the beginning of disintegration by rival warlords, in which the Guangdong Military Government played an extremely odd role. Established in 1917 by Sun Yat-sen and his fellow revolutionaries with some ex-members of the dissolved parliament, it claimed to be the central government of the Chinese Republic. Nonetheless, it failed to acquire support from the local military elites, namely the Guangxi and Yunnan cliques, who had controlled the Guangdong provincial government and denounced the Beijing government. As a result, the Guangdong Military Government could not enforce its practical administration over Guangdong local society, which made it a “government in domestic exile” or a central government without territory under its rule. Thus early Republican Chinese politics contained both vertical and horizontal splits, i.e. central-local, state-society, north-south, etc. This was a consequence of the 1911 Revolution, in which local societies rose to carve up the dynastic state from below and replaced it with a republican state as a coalition of the provincial authorities or a de facto federation. By examining the organization, personnel and policies of the Guangdong Military Government from 1917 to 1921, this paper analyzes the multi-layered structure of politics and identity in the early Republican period.

Margherita Zanasi

“Economic Nationalism and the Construction of Political Legitimacy in Twentieth-Century China.”

This paper examines the interconnectedness between the discourse on nation and imperialism, economic development, and the Nationalist and Communist governments’ construction of political legitimacy in twentieth-century China. Since the late-nineteenth century, notions of economic modernity and development have played a crucial role in the Chinese understanding of modern nationhood, nation building, and imperialism, while nationalist goals have constituted the primary motor of economic reforms. This interconnectedness came to be reflected in the Nationalist and Communist governments’ efforts to build political legitimacy, to mobilize the masses, and to build popular support.

Session 2
June 26, 1:30-3:30

Panel A

Ethnic identification and categorization

Frangville Vanessa
Race and Nationalities: The Ethnic Classification Project within Ideological and Political Strategies

China is officially a multicultural and multiethnic state (duo minzu guojia), including 55 minorities (shaoshu minzu) and the most numerous nationality; the Han (hanzu). From the first full-scale census in the early 1950s to the present day, the question of ethnic minorities has featured high on the PRC political agenda. Minorities come into play as new material for conveying the political ideology of the Party, and setting up a new subject in the PRC propaganda.

The official discourse on minorities and the representation of minorities are particularly interesting to understand how the classification of the Chinese population into a majority Han and numerous minorities has been undertaken to fit to the dominant ideology. Behind very simple images of minorities in propaganda posters, stamps, calendars, or magazines (and even on TV and cinema today), a complex discourse on the search for Chinese national identity in the young PRC takes shape.

The main scope of this paper is to analyze the representation of minorities in official discourse during the “ethnic identification” (minzu shibie) period, from the first campaigns in the 1950s, to 1979 when the last minority had been identified and classified. I will attempt to explain, through representation of minorities, the dominant ideology and the political strategies on a nation-level implied in the ethnic classification. I will argue that the representation of minorities and the treatment of ethnicity question in this period hint a wider strategy that attempts to create a Han national identity and to define a new model of a universal China. Therefore, the study of minorities’ representation at the first stage of the classification may highlight the origin of political pattern of “diversity in unity” described in the 1990s by Fei Xiaotong, father of the anthropology and minority studies in China.

Zeng Chenggui

A Historical Exploration on the Ethnic Policy Made by CPC: from ethnic self-decision to ethnic regional autonomy

China is a unitary multi-ethnic country has a long history. All ethnic groups in China striving in harmony and common prosperity demonstrate the distinction, suitability and correctness of the establishment of the system of ethnic regional autonomy and its basis of the policy of ethnic regional autonomy made by CPC. Creatively combines theory with the actual situation in China, the CPC improve and develop the ethnic policy with the practice move forward. Before 1940s, accepted Lenin’s Thought and decisions of Communist International, the CPC took the opinion of ethnic self-decision as the solution of domestic ethnic problems. An Outline of the Constitution of Chinese Soviet Republic stipulated that the self-decision right of ethnic minorities in China had been admitted and whether united into or disunited out the Chinese Soviet Federation, or established regional autonomy could be decided by the ethnic minorities themselves. During the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, CPC established the thought of
generally agreed that the State has the final word in the classification. This essay project for China’s nation-ethnic classification in Yunnan: Identifying into the Chinese Nationality Family.

Bin Yang

Ethnic Identification in Yunnan: Identifying into the Chinese Nationality Family

Ethnic Classification (Minzu Shibie) in the 1950s-1980s has been a giant and key project for China’s nation-building in the latter 20th century. Scholars have generally agreed that the State has the final word in the classification. This essay
firstly introduces the process of ethnic classification in Yunnan, and then examines
the ignored roles of local governments, ethnic groups, ethnic elites, and
contingency in the classification. I argue that the classifications varied case by case,
without consistent or standard criteria (biaozhun). Finally, by comparing it with
imperial policies, I try to illustrate the historical legacy, continuity, and
development in terms of ethnic and frontier managements between imperial and
modern China.

James Leibold

A Singular or Plural Nation? Competing Narratives of Racial Identity in Wartime China,
1937-1945

This paper explores the numeric imprecision inherent within the new idiom for the
Chinese nation, the Zhonghua minzu, which can be simultaneously rendered as “the
various minzu of China” or “the Chinese minzu.” Looking at Han Chinese
narratives of national belonging during the period of the Sino-Japanese war (1937-
45), it explores the tension between two different formulations: one which rooted
the source of Chinese unity in the “common origin” (tongyuan) of its people and
another which located this unity in the gradual, evolutionary “melding” (ronghe) of
several distinct cultures and races into a new national consciousness.

The paper examines the role of science – namely the new academic disciplines of
ethnology – in legitimating and naturalizing these narratives of national belonging,
while also exploring the effects of the war on discussions of ethnic diversity in
China. It is argued that Japanese manipulation of nationalist sentiment along the
Republic’s frontiers forced Han intellectuals to self-censor their research findings
in line with the Kuomintang ‘single race’ theory. Finally, the paper concludes by
suggesting that we need to rethink the relationship between race and nation in
twentieth century China.

Panel B

Private enterprise and economic nationalism

Ke-wen Wang

The Daogongbao and Wartime Chinese Politics, 1937-45

This paper provides a brief history of the Daogongbao (L’Impartial) during the Sino-
Japanese War (1937-45) and examines its editorial positions and personal
involvement in the politics of wartime China.

Riding on a boom of modern journalism in early 20th Century China, the Daogongbao
became one of the country’s leading newspapers in the prewar decade (1926-37).
The outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan in 1937 ended the fortunes of
most Chinese newspapers, yet the Daogongbao continued to grow in circulation and
influence as the largest private-owned newspaper in unoccupied China. Retreating
with the Guomindang government to the interior, the newspaper served as a
powerful instrument in China’s wartime propaganda and at the same time tried to
distant itself from the government by offering mild criticisms of the GMD.

With Zhang Jiluan and Hu Zhengzhi at its helm, the *Dagongbao* enthusiastically
supported Jiang Jieshi and the GMD as the “center of the state” in her struggle
against foreign aggression. It was therefore suspicious of any political groups that
may threaten that wartime solidarity under Jiang. This basic position explained the
newspaper’s hostile attitude toward the Chinese Communists. After the death of
Zhang Jiluan, who was personally close to Jiang, in 1941, the newspaper did
become more critical of the government, but it never considered the Communists
a legitimate alternative to Jiang and his government throughout the war.

The *Dagongbao* was also hostile toward the peace efforts led by Wang Jingwei
during the war, for the same reason. While attacking Wang and his followers as
“traitors” in his editorials, however, Zhang Jiluan was active in the secret
negotiations between Jiang and the Japanese in Hong Kong from 1938 to 1940.
His “words of war” and “acts of peace” often formed sharp contradictions to one
another. Here Zhang clearly regarded himself, as well as his newspaper, as a
“political insider” who could afford to be a little disingenuous in their rhetoric for
public consumption.

The wartime opinions and activities of the *Dagongbao* and Zhang Jiluan presents an
interesting – and dubious – case of the emerging political influence of modern
Chinese press. Mobilizing the country for war and shoring up public support for
the country’s wartime leadership, the newspaper willingly compromised its
objectivity for a cause that it deemed “patriotic.” Offering his service to secret
“peace deals,” moreover, Zhang expanded his role from that of an observer and
reporter to a player in the politics of the Sino-Japanese War.

**Kwan Man Bun**

Patriotism and Private Enterprise: Jiuda Salt Industries in the Second World War

Established in 1914, Jiuda Salt Industries, Ltd. pioneered the development of
refined salt in modern China. Banking on his sterling reputation as a patriotic
entrepreneur, Fan Xudong also led the company in the abolition of the revenue-
farming system and the free marketing of salt by private enterprise. Drawing on the
company’s archives, personal papers, and government documents, this essay
reconstructs the company’s experience during the Second World War. With its
manufacturing plants seized by the Japanese, Jiuda retreated to Sichuan and
continued its struggle against revenue farmers and competition with the Zigong
salt merchants. At a time when state control of China’s economy expanded, Jiuda
survived the state-oriented policy of the Nationalist government by drawing on its
network of bankers and high government officials. For the company, nationalism
did not mean nationalization.

**Kubo Toru**
Nation-state Building Effort by Guomindang and Financial Technocrats, 1928-1937

As several studies have already suggested, Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) got good results in the financial field of its nation-state building effort during the 1930s. Former financial adviser Arthur N. Young has stressed the important role of western advisers and some leaders of Guomindang Government including T.V. Soong and Kong Xiangxi. Actually their work should be appreciated in a certain degree. But, at the same time, we need pay an attention to the other bureaucrats in the financial organization in the Guomindang Government. Because numerous daily works of the financial organization must be pursued by such many bureaucrats. This paper will try to examine the career and conceptions of some important bureaucrats in the Finance Ministry of Guomindang Government from 1928 to 1937. It is very interesting that some of them had the experience of traditional training as bureaucrats in Qing Dynasty and the knowledge of modern financial thinking. For example, the first vise minister of the Finance Ministry in the Nanjing Guomindang Government, Zhang Shouyong started his career at the traditional local financial organization in Jiangnan region. Similarly, Zou Lin who also worked as the vise minister of the Finance Ministry in the 1930s was originally one of the bureaucrats in the salt administration in Guangdong region. Such semi-modernized bureaucrats helped the Guomindang Government to manage their own financial system. The Guomindang Government could not establish their comparatively concrete finance without such bureaucrats. As they had special ability in modern Chinese financial system, we can call them the financial technocrats of Guomindang Government.

Elisabeth Köll

Railroad Guerillas, Labor Activists and Smugglers: Nationalism and Resistance along the JinPu Line, 1937 to 1949

This paper examines the Tianjin-Pukou railroad in Shandong province during the anti-Japanese war and the ensuing civil war. Without the presence of a strong central government, the JinPu line, like many other railroad companies, suffered from political instability in Shandong’s rural areas during the 1910s and 1920s due to warlord power and military movements that interrupted train services and endangered railway staff, passengers, and goods. The provincial government was deeply suspicious of the Nationalist government under Jiang Kaishek and its policies, resulting in a relatively weak political position of the Guomindang in Shandong during the Nanjing decade. With the beginning of the Japanese occupation in 1937 and the Japanese take-over of the JinPu railroad’s management, the area along the line in Shandong became the main theatre for local resistance fighters and Communist underground activities due to the strategic importance of the JinPu railroad as the most vital economic and military-supply link connecting Beijing in the north and Nanjing and Shanghai in the south.

Session 3
Panel A

Education in the early Republican period

Jiang Na

Wu Leichuan and the Registration Exercise of Yenching University to the Beijing government in the 1920s

This paper is a case study of Wu Leichuan (吴立川), the first Chinese chancellor of Yenching University during the restorating educational right movement period. He was awarded Hanlinyuan shujishi (翰林院庶吉士) in the last metropolitan exam held by the Qing government, but could not be offered a position due to the foundation of the Republican China. He turned into a Christian and was fond of Communism in the 1930s. Wu represents one type of Chinese intellectuals who were caught up between the old and new system in the 1920s, but because of which he was utilized by John Leiden Stuart, president of Yenching University and the Beijing government to handle the delicate Sino-US relations during the restorating educational rights movement and anti-Christianity movement. The resources were mainly drawn from Yenching university archives, Wu's own works and literature on Wu both in English and Chinese.

Jin FENG

Training Her Body for God and For China

Chinese women who attended American missionary colleges in early twentieth-century China found themselves at the margins of two cultures. Yet, as women and missionary graduates, they reworked dominant discourses to represent themselves and thereby transformed their marginalized position in Chinese society into a source of empowerment. Furthermore, because of their unique geopolitical location and bicultural perspective, they also felt acutely the tensions between individual advancement and collective progress, between nationalist sentiment and Christian universalism, and between personal ambitions and traditional expectations of femininity. In order to illustrate how these women’s discursive endeavors reveal complex negotiations of gender, race, class, education, and religion, I will examine the writings by the Chinese and American women who told the stories of Ginling College (金陵女子文理学院, 1915-1952), an all-women’s institution of higher education founded in Nanjing, China by female American protestant missionaries of multiple denominations. Particularly, I will focus on the growth of its Physical Education Department in the mid-1920s in order to create a prism that refracts the vibrant gender negotiations and cultural exchanges not only among members of Ginling but also in the larger context of early twentieth-century Chinese history.
As can be seen from the Chinese women’s experience at Ginling, although nationalism in China often sought to appropriate women’s body and voice for the project of nation-building, at times it also unwittingly provided opportunities for Chinese women to change traditional definitions of class and gender and create new ideas of the female body. However, the missionary definition of Christian femininity also left indelible marks on Ginling’s graduates, for it inculcated in the Chinese students a collective appreciation, if not complete adoption, of an upper-class Western ideal of feminine gentility. In comparison, the missionary faculty’s experience at Ginling on the one hand earned them far more power than was available to them in their own home country. On the other hand, as workers in the mission field who came into direct contact with volatile Chinese national politics and complex gender codes, they also had to make adjustments and accommodations in order to ensure the success of their missions of education and evangelization. Ultimately, the gender and cultural negotiations, more than the construction of the PE department per se, reveal the true mission and value of a Chinese missionary college such as Ginling: its indispensable and unique role as both a catalyst for the cultural modernization of China and a site of cross-cultural engagements that enabled Chinese women’s self-significations.

James Carter

Travels of Tan Xu: Buddhism and Nationalism in 20th-Century China

Tan Xu’s experience in Harbin is a useful example for many of his projects. Arriving in 1921, Tan Xu assessed the city’s religious landscape: Tan Xu’s frustration at the lack of a Buddhist temple in “a Chinese place” reflects the conjunction of religion and nationalism in his mission. At the invitation of local authorities, Tan Xu addressed this situation by founding Jilesi (Paradise Temple), in 1924. Located at the entrance to the city’s Russian cemetery, the temple was both the first Buddhist temple in the city, and the first instance of traditional Chinese architecture there. He repeated this pattern at other temples, including the Surangama Temple in Yingkou, Liaoning province (1921), the Temple of Expansive Wisdom in Changchun (1922), and Verdant Peak Temple in Qingdao (1931). In addition, Tan Xu renovated important temples in Shenyang, Tianjin, Xi’an, and Hong Kong.

In addition to his temple-building activities, Tan Xu’s commentary on the Heart Sutra has become one of the most commonly read Buddhist texts, establishing Tan Xu as an influence on a new generation of Buddhists. My research suggests that the Heart Sutra provided in its emphasis on “emptiness as form, and form as emptiness” an opportunity for Tan Xu to simultaneously dismiss the tragedies of China’s 20th-century as illusory, while providing the hope that these tragedies might yet yield enlightenment for both the nation and the individual.

Thomas DuBois

Japan and Religion in Manchukuo - Perceptions and Policies
Certain aspects of Japanese imperialism in Asia are well known – the unusual brutality of its military occupation most obviously – but also its unique version of the *mission civilatrice*, the “Japanification” (*kōminka* 皇民化) policy, which coerced colonial subjects to take on Japanese surnames, use Japanese language and dress, and to engage in Japanese style religious worship. While this policy was not employed directly in the technically independent nation of Manchukuo (1932-1945), similar ideas of pan-Asian spiritual reformation guided every aspect of this closely engineered society.

However, despite the heavy, effectively complete control that Japan exerted over the administration of Manchukuo, the creation of a religion for the new nation was not a single-minded project. Even loyal adherents to this project thought about the spiritual reformation of Manchukuo in very different ways, divided in particular by occupation and training. Scholars, commercial publishers, administrators, jurists and missionaires each brought a unique perspective to the spiritual mission of Japan in Manchukuo (and on the continent in general). In my presentation, I will introduce the general aims of religious policy in Manchukuo, but also demonstrate how each of these groups – what might be thought of as “discourse communities” further structured its thoughts according to the internal logic of discipline and profession.

The paper posted on the conference page is a more detailed analysis of one aspect of this problem, the changing portrayal of religion in the Japanese-owned *Shengjing Times* from 1907-1944. Over this long period, the newspaper changed ownership and editorial mission, and its portrayal of religion shifted in focus from the anti-superstition campaigns of the traditional Chinese elite, to salacious tales of saints and sinners meant to increase circulation. By the late 1930s, these earlier concerns were eclipsed by the need to actively support the spiritual mission of Japanese imperialism.

**Panel B**

**Racial thought and policy**

**Limin Bai**

Chinese Perceptions of the World and Races: An Analysis of a Republican Textbook Chinese Geography

This paper discusses social Darwinism and nationalism in the republican period by examining one of the republican textbook series, Chinese Geography.

This textbook, first produced by the Commercial Press in 1913, was designed for teaching geography to students in the third academic year of high primary schools and intended for two semesters. It has 36 pages in total; the first eight chapters cover four continents: Oceania, Africa, North America and South America; then from Chapter Nine to Chapter Eleven the text centers on the general knowledge of earth, astronomy, earth biology, history and cultures.
The most interesting feature of this sheer textbook is the dominance of the Chinese version of social Darwinism - the ‘survival of the fittest’: “In today's world, [all the civilized nations and races] have survived while uncivilized ones are extinct. This is a natural selection” (p. 17a). This concept is repeated along with the introductions of the continents, nations, races, cultures and history. It then points out that the inferiority and superiority exist not only among races but, more importantly, in political systems. With a brief introduction to three categories of the political systems: absolute monarchy, constitutional monarchy and democracy (republic), the textbook links them to the definition of the status of countries: an independent country, a country under the protection of another country and a country being colonized. It contends that a politically sound government would keep its country independent, and weak countries have to struggle for their survival among the powerful nations.

This textbook reflects the intellectual milieu which formed in the 1890s, when China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War and the publication of Yan Fu's translation of Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics stirred cries for reforms in education and institutional systems. A comparison between this textbook and Lin Shu's primer Songs for Educating Children (about 1895) indicates that both texts employed social Darwinism, in an attempt to simulate the Nationalism among young students. In Lin’s primer, there is a strong sense of crisis, warning that China had to change quickly, otherwise, the country would be colonized like Poland and India, and Chinese people would become slaves of the western Powers. In this republican textbook, with the introduction of physical, political and cultural geography, the focus is on colonizers and the colonized, which enforced the theory of the “survival of the fittest”. This comparison shows that China's humiliation by the western Powers contributed decisively to the Chinese interpretation of social Darwinism which provided the Chinese nationalism with a theoretical framework. This nationalism has shaped the Chinese mentality for over centuries, though under different political powers it displays in different forms.

Li Ziyuan

西方多民族国家的自治立法与中国的民族法治建设研究 (Study on establishment law for self-governance in Western multiethnic societies and legal minority governance in China)

1. 西方多民族国家的自治立法: 西方多民族国家中，为保障少数民族实行某种形式的自治——如民族自治或地方自治权利，西班牙就纳地方区域制定相应法律。已制定在1948年和1971年先后颁布过两个《自治法》；西班牙1978年后，根据新宪法确认了自治制度。巴斯克地区共同体拥有立法权、享有征税权；丹麦的格陵兰岛1979年实行自治，在确保国家统一的前提下，自治当局享有日常生活中大多数领域的行政、立法权力；芬兰1921年形成的《芬兰奥兰群岛自治法》；英国1998年通过的代行权力法授予苏格兰、北爱尔兰、威尔士“代行权力”等等。尽管这些国家自治立法的内容和方式有所不同，但实行自治立法的因素都与民族问题
相关，都是强调了立足本国、本地区、本民族的实际，并呈现出不同的特点。


3· 西方国家与中国民族自治立法的几点认识: 西方一些国家民族自治立法，往往是与试图分离的少数民族发生冲突后达成协议的结果，是双方妥协的产物，是预防和缓解民族冲突的一种机制。由于特殊历史背景、民族构成、文化环境和现实状况，自治立法没有固定的模式。但所追求的目标是基本一致的，都是有利于国家的统一、民族的团结、社会的发展进步为标准。而新中国成立以来的民族自治立法，则是依据马克思主义民族平等理论，不仅人口较多的少数民族有自治权，就是人口较少的民族也能平等的享有管理本民族内部事务的权力。五十多年来，特别是改革开放以来，中国的民族法制体系已经基本形成，为包括民族区域自治在内的民族政策的贯彻实施提供了强大的法律保障。随着形势的发展和依法行政的要求，尤其是在建设社会主义市场经济体制的新形势下，还要进一步加强民族法制建设，通过发挥法制的作用，不断强化民族区域自治制度的坚持和完善工作。当然，中国的民族法治建设也强调要从民族地区的实际出发，将原则性与灵活性结合起来，就是指国家的法律、政策等大政方针的落实要结合民族地区的实际。如民族区域自治制度本身就体现了原则性与灵活性相结合的特点，根据《民族区域自治法》规定，民族自治地方必须贯彻执行国家的法律、政策，但许多法律、政策又都明确规定民族自治地方可以依据原则精神，从当地和民族的实际出发，行使相应的变通权力。
Session 4
June 27, 9:30-12:00

Panel A

“Policy in the Proposal: Cold War and Maoist China”
Organized by Linsun Cheng and Yixin Chen

Yixin Chen

From Great Scheme to Great Disaster: Cases of Anhui and Jiangxi in the Great Leap Forward Famine

This paper examines why Anhui and Jiangxi, two neighboring provinces in inland China, had dramatic difference in their death rates of people during China’s Great Leap Forward Famine between 1958 and 1961. Previous scholarship has led us to
a general understanding of Mao’s enthusiasm for a great scheme in agriculture under influence of Khrushchev, China’s grain production during the Great Leap, and the death of the peasants in the famine (Roderick MacFarquhar, Dali Yang, Justin Lin, and Jasper Backer). Scholars have also shown us, with a study of provincial governors or with a case of a province, how limited in power the provincial leaders had been in facing Mao’s authority in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Frederick Teiwes and Jean-lug Domenach). However, the aforementioned studies have never told us how the famine had occurred to local societies and why there had been regional variants of death sometimes only separated by a few miles, for instance, 6.33 million deaths in Anhui and 0.18 million in Jiangxi, or respectively 18.37% of Anhui’s population and 1.06% of Jiangxi’s.

Based on published document collections, recently available memoirs and biographies of Anhui’s and Jiang’s party secretaries and governors, and village interviews with the peasants, this paper attempts to argue that the difference of seriousness in policy implementation by provincial leaders holds the key to understanding of regional variants of population deaths in the Great Leap Famine. In Anhui, provincial party secretary Zeng Xisheng was notoriously known for his reckless enforcement of cruel policies of the Great Leap, particularly in regard to the food quota of rural public dining halls. When deputy governor Zhang Kaifan dissolved the dining halls in his home county, Zeng even organized struggle sessions against Zhang who would later be placed under house arrest for over a year as a result of Mao’s personal disapproval of Zhang’s action. Zeng’s reckless promotion of the Great Leap forced local cadres to take more cruel policies, which in turn caused not only a mass death of the peasants but also a general fear to cadres and provincial tyrant Zeng. Yet in Jiangxi, provincial party secretary Yang Shangkui and governor Shao Shiping never tried to implement the Great Leap policies seriously once they realized that the policies had caused famine in the countryside. Moreover, governor Shao and others went ahead dissolve many public dining halls before Mao and Central Government permitted. Yang Shangkui even reported Zeng, when they met in a meeting in 1959, that some his relatives in Anhui were in starvation and advised Zeng not to carry out policies too seriously. In the end, the different attitude toward Mao’s policies not only led to two different sets of deaths rates, but also attracted tens of thousands of Anhui peasants to flee to Jiangxi. To everyone’s surprise, these Anhui refugees received food supply when they arrived in the neighboring province and survived there.

Linsun Cheng

A painful and expensive transition—the take over and reorganization of China’s industries in early 1950s

As Chinese Liberation Army marching toward Nanjing, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to transfer its work focus from military activities to economic construction and from rural areas to cities. Well aware of China’s backwardness, the top leaders of CCP, including Mao Zedong, Chen Yun, Chen Yi and others, adopted a realistic approach in dealing with economic affairs after CCP took over China. In taking over those industrial enterprises left by the Nationalist
government, the CCP heavily relied on the top officials of the National Resources Commission, the representative of the so-called “bureaucratic capital.” In restoring industrial production, the CCP depended on those technocrats who once worked in the enterprises owned by KMT government. In figuring the future industrial plans, the CCP leaders also respected and used those technocrats.

The intensification of the cold war, however, left deep impact upon those decision-makers of the newly-established Chinese government. Based on the assumption that the imperialist countries would attack or help KMT to attack China sooner or later, the new Chinese leaders changed their approaches in many important issues relating to Chinese economic development. Since China had to depend upon Russia’s help in the future wars with the imperial countries, they decided to adopt “one-side inclination” policy. Since those technocrats who once worked in KMT enterprises were mainly trained in Western countries or in Western ways even if they did not study abroad, they were no longer be trusted. Since war might broke out anytime, China’s economic centers should be set up in the areas far away from Chinese coast areas where once served as China’s economic centers.

The Chinese economy paid heavy price for these changes of Chinese leaders’ economic approaches and their consequent economic decisions. To some extent, the approaches formed in early 1950s were followed and reinforced later on when the Chinese government decided to set up the so-called “third line.”

This paper will trace back the process of the changing approaches and the related economic decisions, explore the causes leading to these changes, and analyze the costs they inflicted into Chinese economy and provide a more completed picture of Chinese economic transition in early 1950s.

Shiwei Chen

History in Three Mobilizations: A Reexamination of the Chinese Biological Warfare Allegations against the U.S. in the Korean War

Fifty-three years have passed since the beginning of the Korean War. One of the most shocking and notorious episodes which occurred during the War was the Chinese allegation against the U.S. in 1952 that the U.S. used biological weapons against Chinese and Korean civilians. Since then, voluminous scholarship has been produced on the subject, trying to determine the validity of this allegation. While the previous scholarship provided us with a solid basis for understanding the biological warfare itself as a military incident, it did not, however, supply sufficient ground for addressing the more comprehensive issues such as the political implication of the event on China’s international relations in the circumstances of the Cold War. For this reason, the biological warfare case opens up possibilities for new methodological studies.

Relying on archival materials collected from the Joseph Needham Archives at the Cambridge University Library and the Imperial War Museum in London, this paper seeks to examine the role of the Chinese scientists in the organization of the biological warfare allegation and their special relationship with Joseph Needham, a leading biochemist at Cambridge University, in China’s biological warfare
campaign. In particular, the paper examines the Chinese biological warfare allegation through three politically interrelated mobilizations: the Chinese mobilization of the scientists at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the attempt to establish a new international united front with the pro-communist scientists in the West; Joseph Needham’s mobilization of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China (ISC) in his efforts to gain support from Beijing in order to accomplish his new research project; and the British Government’s mobilization of the intellectuals, news medias and academics in the formation of an anti-Needham campaign of refuting the allegation. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how a single historical event, such as the biological warfare allegation, could have mushroomed into a large international experience that not only stirred the anxieties of a desperate public, but also created an unexpected atmosphere in which science and politics intermingled to produce a serious outcome.

Dayong Niu
China’s Nuclear Developments and American Reactions in the Early 1960’s.

The Nuclear development in the P. R. China had always been a place of worry for American government in early 1960s. How to handle this prospect? American government did, in its China policy-making process, exert great mental effort on this problem. Anyway, if China had become a nuclear power in as early as 1960s, with hostile feelings towards US, what dangers could be faced by US? The policy makers of US were, for stopping this development, trying to find some counter measures alternatively: Resorting to force to take a pre-emptive attack to destroy China’s nuclear program? Or resolving the issue by political measures or encountering China’s nuclear threat in future by U.S. overwhelming advanced nuclear power? If the US would have opted for destroying China’s nuclear base by pre-emptive attack, it would have led to a war in which it is unknown that what kind of retaliatory strike would be resorted to the US by China and the so-called “socialist bloc”. But if it would have chosen political measures it would have to take some steps to readjust its bilateral relations with China.

Another matter that attracts the attention of scholars is that JFK administration was spying closely Chinese nuclear advancement on frequent intervals to work out suitable means to combat it. Some documents on this issue declassified in late 1980 show that US had planned to carry out a “surgical operation” on China’s nuclear base. This was not realized mainly because of there was no response from USSR.[1] With more and more historical documents become declassified, a complete understanding of JFK counter measure policies against China and a view on his attitude towards China’s nuclear development can be judged from the war memory and the crisis control angle.

Xiaowu Hu
The National Power and Urban Social Structure Change in the Maoist Period (1949—1976)
The outline of the study:

The urbanization process in China has undergone a long and twist road in history especially in Mao time. The historically left issues bring about many problems to modern China’s urbanization and modernization process. During the period from 1949 to 1976, the highly centralized national power has imposed too much in society, what is the truth and fact of the relationship between national power and social life; how did the regime of the national power conducted; what is the consequence of the kind of relationship between the national power and society? This study tries to make a deep research on the relationship between the national power and the society in Mao time (1949—1976) in a view of exploring the change of urban social structure.

The value and significance of this study:

By make a deep exploration on the change of urban social structure in Mao time, we can get a clear understanding of the relationship between the national power and society. And we can learn more about the urbanization and modernization process in contemporary China.

The main plan of the study:

1. To make historical analysis on the relationship between national power and urban society before Mao time.
2. To make historical research on the change of the relationship between national and urban society in Mao time and make a comparison with the pre-Mao time relationship
3. To find about the decision making regime of the national power.
4. To find about the reaction regime of the urban society.
5. Study the true relationship between the national power and the change of urban social structure in Mao time.
6. Make a conclusion on the problems which left by the Mao time to the modern China’s urbanization and modernization under the frame of the relationship between the national power and society in Mao time.

The method and material collection of this study:

The national and society could be studied in many dimensions, this essay choose the central decision and local reaction dimension to explain how was the national power centralized and the urban social structure changed in Mao time. And many of the materials can be found in the CPCNC’s government report and the previous five 5-year national plan communiques. Furthermore there are many study works have been published and many statistics can be found in many libraries.

Panel B

Local actors in national trends
Stephen R. Platt

“Hunanese Nationalism”

In 1902, a Hunanese student in Japan published an open letter to the gentry of his native province arguing that they should steer the course not of a province, but of an incipient nation. By his formulation, China was destined to follow the Roman empire into oblivion, but Hunan could, alone, carry the essence of Chinese civilization into the modern world just as France and England had done for Rome. This paper will explore how a number of influential Hunanese publicists in the early 1900's argued that their province – rather than whole of the Qing empire – might be the basis of a future “Chinese” nation. Their visions of the Hunanese future offer a vivid portrait of the conflict between local and imperial forms of patriotism that emerged during China’s transition from empire to nation-state.

Zheng Yangwen

Hunan: Laboratory of Reform and Land of Revolution

Hunan produced the largest number and most able leaders for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). How could this land-locked, sleepy and conservative province produce so many revolutionaries? Roy Hofheinz had this to say about my birthplace: “Like Prussia she produced great generals and conservative aristocrats, like Hungary great nationalists, like Britain great reformers, and like France great revolutionists.”[1] Angus McDonald equalled the Hunanese to eighteenth century Virginians who played a role in the American war of national liberation.[2] This paper (written for Modern Asian Studies) examines the consequences of three consecutive political theatres and their actors from the 1850s to the twentieth century that turned yumi zhi xiang or “home of fish and rice” into the laboratory of reform and land of revolution. It tried to comprehend what three generations of Hunanese did that pushed Hunan to and kept Hunan in the national spotlight. It will picture the materials that gave them a common colour. The Hunanese, be they Qing loyalists, Han nationalists or radical communists, dominated China’s political stage from the 1850 to the late twentieth century. With the wind of Hunan gone, we must look back to re-examine this province to see how it had helped shaped and changed the course of Chinese history. I hope to advance the study of local history and argue that it is better to study local history/makers in our effort to understand national and even world histories. Hunan is my case in point.

Ong Chang Woei

Building a New Chinese State from the Northwest: The Proposal of Liu Guangfen (1843-1903)

Chi Zhen

Bleeding Heads and Muddied Hands: The Local Self-government of Wanxi
Wanxi is located in the southwest part of Henan. It includes four counties. In 1930, under some local elites’ lead, there was a local self-government in this region and it lasted ten years. This paper discusses the local self-government of Wanxi from two dimensions - state-power extension and rural construction. The local self-government did some good works on stabilizing and developing the countryside. One of the reasons for its success was that the self-government expelled the Guomindang administration out of Wanxi and got full autonomy. Throughout the history of the self-government project of Wanxi, the more the state stressed the direct and effective top-down control over the local society, the less enthusiasm there was for the countryside to develop itself. When the state lessened the tight control over the local society, the countryside would be more enthusiastic and creative in developing itself.

May-bo Ching

When Shanghai meets Guangdong: The Shanghai elements in the evolution of Cantonese music in the 1920s and 30s

Since Shanghai became a treaty port in 1843, a considerable number of Guangdong merchants and compradors went to Shanghai to seek business opportunities. With their massive capital and experiences of dealing with foreigners, Guangdong merchants were soon able to establish their sphere of influence in Shanghai. In a different cultural and dialect setting, Guangdong merchants patronized various Cantonese musical activities through the public office (gongsuo), martial art and sports association, and theatre they founded in Shanghai. As a cultural center, Shanghai served as a forum for various regional cultures to encounter with one another. It was under such circumstances that Cantonese music, songs, and opera absorbed fresh nutrients from Western music, other regional operas, and the newly emerged popular Mandarin songs composed and broadcasted in Shanghai. Entertainment magazines published in Shanghai also became medium for various cultural exchanges. It is therefore not a coincidence that Cantonese music, songs, and opera underwent a significant transformation in the 1920s and 30s. The case of the evolution of Cantonese music, songs, and opera in the 1920s and 30s show that, paradoxically, the cultural character of a certain region is very often shaped and underpinned in another region in a totally different cultural and dialect setting.

Session 5
June 27, 1:00-3:00

Panel A
Policy and public initiative - NGOs and private organizations

Charles A. Keller
Xuesheng yundong: Chinese “Christian” Students, YMCAs, and NGOs in Republican China

This paper examines the Chinese Christian Student Movement (SCM) as the foremost example of how the Chinese YMCA, in its secular role as an NGO, made a significant contribution to the urban discourse on nationalist activism that ensued in Republican China. The SCM was a grass-roots organization of Christian fellowships on middle school and college campuses that began with the sponsorship of the YMCA and YWCA in the early 1920s. SCM members were the "model citizens" that American Y secretaries hoped their programs would produce, and their movement represented some of the major forces that shaped China during the 1920s-1930s, including a "Westernized" form of the Confucian "ethic of community" informed by a growing acceptance of Marxist critiques of society. Although American Y secretaries were adamantly opposed to Marxism and the CCP, Chinese student Y workers and SCM leaders were open to a more materialist analysis of China's contemporary social problems and alternative versions of the "road out".

The SCM is portrayed here as a successful manifestation of the early work of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China. The Chinese YMCA, American YMCA, and other national Y associations around the world were examples of NGOs, that as constituent bodies of the World’s Alliance of YMCAs formed an international non-governmental organization (INGO). The founding of the Chinese YMCA in 1895 occurred during a period of tremendous growth in this type of organization that continued throughout the twentieth century. In its early years, the YMCA was part of the expanding Protestant missionary enterprise in Asia, but as an NGO, the Y’s role in China also had important, secular implications that found one expression in the activism of the SCM. By placing the expansion of the Y in China within this new context, it is easier to understand the characteristics it had in common with other NGOs and transnational organizations, such as the American Red Cross. This also provides some historical continuity for the large volume of research that is ongoing concerning contemporary Chinese NGOs.

The paper emphasizes the participation of SCM and Y members in the initial demonstrations of the December Ninth Movement as a specific case where an NGO became, in effect, a subtle political actor in the social flux of the Republican period. Several members of these organizations participated in those famous marches as politically-cognizant young Chinese citizens. Their rhetoric of protest included modern constructs of nationhood, national sovereignty, citizenship, participatory civil society, and the right to freedom of expression. With this charged lexicon, the students were employing recently acquired "cultural" products to write a jeremiad of imperialism’s injustices and thus fulfill their traditional Confucian duty as a privileged class to "save the nation". That this nationalist political activism was learned through a transnational process occurring within an international network of NGOs and personal associations is one of the interesting conclusions of this research.
Xiao-huang Yin

The Interface of the Global and the Local: A Study of Transnational Organizations Founded by PRC Immigrants in America

This paper is a study of different types of transnational organizations established by immigrants from the People’s Republic of China in America since the 1970s. Like their counterparts from other parts of the Chinese world, these new generations of Chinese immigrants have demonstrated extraordinary abilities for networking. Furthermore, while the vast differences in their political affiliations, socioeconomic status, and religious backgrounds make them highly diversified in their opinions on American politics, these new Chinese immigrants have shown great interest in political, social, and economic development in China; and they have been actively involved in a wide-range of China-related affairs. Based on their organization patterns, missions and activities as well as other characteristics, we can divide transnational nonprofit organizations set up by immigrants from China since the 1970s into three major groups:

1. Transnational Hometown Organizations: Recent immigrants from China are known for founding fraternity-style associations based on their hometown origins. Beijingers’ Society, Shanghainese Association, and Nanjingers’ Club in California are a few such examples. These newly established transnational community organizations have become effective vehicles for recent immigrants in their philanthropic giving to their hometowns in China.

2. Transnational Alumni Associations: China’s major universities such as Beida, Tsinghua, and Nanda all have large numbers of alumni in America. These alumni associations--some are new while others are reinvigorated in recent years--collect donations from their members and earmark the money for their alma mater in China.

3. Transnational Academic Societies: They include academic societies founded by PRC immigrants since the 1970s, and they have volunteered their teaching, expertise, and other services to China. The Chinese Economists Society, Chinese Historians in the United States, Association of Chinese Scientists and Engineers, and Overseas Young Chinese Forum are a few such examples. As nonprofit organizations registered in America, they have actively engaged in organizing teaching and lecture tours as well as other service-related activities in China.

In what ways do these new Chinese immigrant transnational NGOs differ from traditional overseas Chinese community organizations? How do they reflect changes in Chinese abroad in the age of globalization? And what is their real and potential impact on the overseas Chinese experience? This paper is an attempt to find some answers to the questions.

A. Tom Grunfeld

Civil Society and NGOs in China

When China ended its isolation in the 1980s it reaped the material benefits that came from international trade and investment and acquired international legitimacy,
while at the same time exposing itself to the vagaries of international politics. One negative consequence for Beijing has been the sustained criticism from both governments and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) about presumed shortcomings on issues such as human rights, religious freedom and democracy.

A more positive consequence has been the re-emergence of a civil society, however imperfect. This expansion of civic space allowed for, among other things, the ability of foreign NGOs to begin operating in China. This development, in turn, led to the formation of Chinese NGOs; although in China there are no genuine NGOs since Chinese organizations are either supported directly by the government or indirectly through scholarly institutions. The Chinese government’s fear of free association makes the establishment of a true NGO not yet possible.

Nevertheless, NGOs thrived as the Beijing government, for the most part, did not interfere with their activities. Towards international organizations Beijing engaged in counter-propaganda efforts, defending themselves against charges of wrongdoing. Towards domestic NGOs Beijing has been largely tolerant, allowing them the chance to operate as freely as possible within the confines of the current political climate as long as they stayed away from hot-button issues such as Tibetan or Taiwanese independence, religious freedom, etc.

However, recent events in Georgia (2003), the Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) - along with Serbia in 2000 - have brought about an abrupt change in Beijing’s attitude. These countries experienced peaceful transitions (“smokeless wars”) of governments thanks to popular unrest fueled and energized by both international and local NGOs. Many of their domestic NGOs were funded by international organizations, mostly from the United States. These associations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute, the Open Society Institute, etc., worked in conjunction with official US government radio stations such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia in concerted campaigns designed to establish, what they claim, are democratic governments through both overt and covert means.

These “color revolutions” (the opposition in each nation adopted a color to represent their cause: rose in Georgia, orange in the Ukraine and tulip in Kyrgyzstan) have created considerable anxiety on the part of the Chinese government and brought about an abrupt change in policy towards all NGOs, even those that are government sponsored. Censorship has increased and the Ministry of Civil Affairs has stopped processing registrations of new and existing groups. Registration, essential in order to operate openly, is now in the hands of the Public Security Bureau.

Provincial social science academies have been instructed to study the NGO phenomenon and researchers have been dispatched to central Asia and eastern Europe to investigate the “color revolutions.” In addition, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader and President of China, Hu Jingtao, recently gave a speech to his comrades in the CCP called “Fighting the People’s War Without Gunsmoke” which warned officials of the possible dangers of some NGOs. Rumors in China...
have it that by the end of 2005 a new policy towards domestic NGOs, at the very least, will be articulated.

This paper proposes to examine the Chinese government’s on-going response to both international and domestic NGOs in light of the present political climate and to examine the NGOs’ successes and failures in achieving their stated aims.

Ren Yunlan
Local Elite and Charities: a Case Study of Modern Tianjin

地方精英与慈善事业:近代天津的个案研究

Local elite were a special social group. They were local officials, gentries, merchants and scholars who held high social status and great social prestige, a considerable amount of social wealth, as well as social influence. They were very active in local affairs especially in social charities. Modern Tianjin was situated on the end of many rivers with rich waters and convenient transportation as well as frequently famine and flood. In Tianjin, an important industrial and commercial city in north China lived the rich with great social wealth and the poor as well as the victims of repeatedly natural calamity. How did the rich and the poor get on well with each other in a city? Social relief and charities were the bridge between two sides and the buffer for social conflicts. In terms of protecting family property, setting up social image and having benevolences for accumulating virtue, the local elite of Tianjin were very zealous for local public affairs and charities. Their philanthropy such as setting up kitchen for the poor, giving alms (clothes, tea, medicine and coffins), fostering babies, orphans, widows, the elders and the disabled made themselves and their families recognized by the authorities, and obtaining the symbolic capital and mental satisfaction. The more important is that by having a hand in local benevolences, local elite became active in the relationship between the state and society, and indirectly participating in the governmental affairs. After all, to resolve the poor problem is dominantly the governmental affairs.
Panel B
China and the World - Qing and Republic

Dong WANG
China Interacts with the World: Unequal Treaties, Imperialism, and Nationalism

This study deals with the linguistic development and polemical uses of the expression Unequal Treaties, which refers to the treaties China signed between 1842 and 1946. Although this expression has occupied a central position in both Chinese collective memory and Chinese and English historiographies, this is the first study to offer an in-depth examination of China's encounters with the outside world as manifested in the rhetoric surrounding the Unequal Treaties. The “discourse of the Unequal Treaties” is examined as a distinctive form of diplomatic, legal, political, and cultural nationalism which yields manifold regional and global meanings.

First, I problemize the concept of the Unequal Treaties, as it is commonly employed. While the phrase has long been widely used, it nevertheless lacks a clear and unambiguous meaning. Furthermore, there is no agreement about the actual number of treaties signed between China and foreign countries that should be counted as “unequal.” In a world of power politics, many treaties contain unequal provisions. The question is why, in spite of this basic disagreement about what the phrase should designate, it became, and remains, a —perhaps the — rallying cry for Chinese patriots of different political and social allegiance.

Second, I trace the development in late Qing (1840-1912) of the concepts that were later to be embodied in the debates surrounding the Unequal Treaties. My major departure from existing English and Chinese historiographies is to place the establishment of the treaty system against the backdrop of the ongoing rhetoricalization and politicalization of the phrase Unequal Treaties.

Third, this study throws light on a new phase in the Chinese understanding of the Unequal Treaties in the first quarter of the twentieth century by considering not only state-to-state diplomacy but also the management of treaty rights and obligations at the local level.

Fourth, this study provides insight into the strained and precarious relationship between the GMD (Nationalist Party) and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) from 1923 to 1927, the period of their first united front, by focusing on their approaches to the treaties.

Fifth, I argue that an analysis of party pronouncements on the Unequal Treaties in the 1930s and 1940s allows us to approach the CCP’s 1949 victory from a new
angle. Over the twenty years from 1928 to 1947, the two parties molded memories of the Unequal Treaties in a variety of ways, reflecting attempts to connect support for party and state with broader issues of national unification and independence.

Sixth, I turn attention to the features that have shaped the dissemination of international law in China from the nineteenth century onwards. Shifting from the focus on language and translation as a tool of cultural transmission—so popular in studies of modern and contemporary Chinese culture and literature—I argue that the diffusion of international law in China was to a great extent motivated by what the Chinese learnt from their efforts to revise and annul the Unequal Treaties. And this points to the conclusion that the spread of international law can take place only in the context of a given nation’s culture and history at a specific historical moment.

**Haiming Liu**

**Chinese Exclusion Laws and U.S.-China Relationship**

Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, followed by a series of Chinese exclusion laws, barred the Chinese from coming to the United States for half a century. It is one of the most racist immigration legislation in American history. Scholars have written extensively on why this law was passed and concluded that racial environment in California, white union activities, and racist political campaigns by opportunistic politicians were mainly responsible for the passage of this law. From an international perspective, this article explores roles played by U.S.-China relationship in the making of Chinese exclusion laws, an area often ignored by other scholars. While existing scholarships on this topic have focused on American racial politics, this article documents how U.S.-China relationship impacted the making of Chinese exclusion laws. My argument is that racist immigration laws reflect not only domestic situation in America but also China’s international standing and ups and downs in U.S.-China relationship. Racism against Chinese Americans is often a simultaneously domestic and international issue. American trade interest in Asia, China’s international standing and ups and downs in U.S.-China relationship could all contribute to the shaping of racial and immigration policy in America.

**Chen Hongmin**

**The Decline of Chinese Suzerainty over Korea: The Case of the 1887 Korean Mission to the United States**

陈红民

中国在朝鲜宗主权的衰微——以1887年朝鲜遣使事件为中心

The late Qing government was subjected to twin pressures in its foreign relations: the superior military might of the Western Powers compelled it to cede territory and pay indemnities; while neighbouring tributary states took the opportunity to break free from Chinese control and gain their “independence.” The former set of
circumstances is well known, but the latter has received comparatively little academic attention, despite the fact that it is indispensable to the study of late Qing foreign relations. The Chinese-Korean relationship serves as a highly apposite example of the painful experience of the late Qing government in confronting challenges mounted by its small neighbouring states.

In 1887 the Korean government dispatched envoys to the Western powers, in order to deny Chinese suzerainty and proclaim to the world Korea’s “independence and sovereignty. “ The Chinese resident minister in Korea, Yuan Shikai, realizing Korean ambitions, attempted to block the departure of the mission. When this failed, Yuan specified three conditions (sanduan) that the Koreans must respect so as to maintain Chinese suzerainty. This communication received a perfunctory response from the Korean government. When the Korean envoy to the United States, Park Chung Yang arrived in Washington, he completely ignored the three conditions. The Chinese government charged that Pak be recalled and disciplined by the Korean government. However, throughout the whole episode the Korean authorities went their own way, despite giving an outward show of compliance to Chinese requests. Because of the weakness of the Qing government and the increasing obsolescence of the vassal state system in the contemporary international environment, Korea was able to fall back on the Western powers to stymie China in its efforts to effectively maintain the suzerain relationship.

On the basis of research materials drawn from the Academia Sinica in Taipei, this paper examines the 1887 mission of Park Jung Yang to the United States. It concludes that this episode not only pointed to the decline of Chinese suzerainty over Korea, but also signified, due to the alteration of China’s traditional role in Korea, a further weakening of China’s position in the international arena.

近代中国的对外交往中，受着双重的挤压：一方面清政府在与西方列强对抗中，被人以船坚炮利相逼，割地赔款，另一方面原先朝贡体系中的邻近小国，则乘机追求摆脱中国控制的”自主“。前一种情形人所共知，后一种情形则较少为学界所注意，而对于研究近代中国的对外交往，有着不可替代的作用。清政府与朝鲜的关系较为典型展示了清政府是如何”痛苦“地面对邻近小国反抗的。

1887年，朝鲜政府中追求”独立自主“的势力要求向欧美各国派遣使者，以向国际间宣示其”自主“，而否定中国的宗主权。驻节朝鲜的袁世凯意识到朝鲜的用意，先是企图阻止，阻止不成，便制定朝鲜使节必须遵循的三项规定（称”三端”），以维持中国宗主地位。朝鲜方面虚以应付，奉命出使美国的朴正阳（Pak Chung Yang）到达后，无视”三端“，自行其事。中国方面认为朴昌镐”态度不逊“，破”了”属邦体制“，要求撤回朴正阳，并加惩处。在此过程中，朝鲜政府一再阳奉阴违，拖延敷衍。由于清政府自身虚弱，且”属邦体制“在当时国际环境下已不合时宜，朝鲜方面不时借助列强之力牵制中国，使得中国方面并能未如愿.
Zhang Leiping
Trade between Qing in China and Nguyen in Vietnam in 19th century
National University of Singapore
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Session 6
June 27, 3:30-5:30

Panel A
Rethinking Identity and Legitimacy in the Nation-Building Process of 20th-Century China (2)
Organized by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee

Joseph Tse-Hei Lee
“Religion and Modern State: The Three-Self Patriotic Movement in South China during the Maoist era”

The response of Chinese Protestant congregations to the Three-Self Patriotic Movement after the Communist Revolution of 1949 reveals the complexity of church and state relations throughout the Maoist era (1949–1976). This paper examines the issue by looking at the experience of Chinese Baptist, Presbyterian and Independent Christian communities in the Chaozhou region of northeastern Guangdong Province. Because these Protestant communities were an integrated part of the local political, social and economic power structure before the Communist takeover of South China, most of the church leaders refused to be subject to the control of the Maoist state.

By rejecting the Maoist vision of a socialist state, the church leaders adhered to the Baptist, Presbyterian and independent Protestant denominational principles of the locality of the church, proclaiming that each church should be an autonomous body, governing its affairs and remaining independent from state control. However, the Communist state perceived ideological identification as synonymous with absolute loyalty to the new socialist nation. Religious conversion was seen as an attack on Maoism and a protest against the state.

While the state launched the Three-Self Patriotic Movement to politicize the religious sphere and intervene in church affairs, some Protestant groups relied on existing lineage networks to create autonomous worshipping communities across
the region. This pattern of Christian activism not only highlights the role of popular resistance against state-imposed modernity, but also reminds us of what James C. Scott calls “weapons of the weakest” in popular protests by a subordinate group against the hegemonic power under the most oppressive circumstances.

**Ka-che Yip**

“New Army Doctors for a New China: The Central Military Medical School during the Sino-Japanese War.”

The outbreak of the war against Japan in 1937 focused attention on the ability of the Army Medical School (later the Central Military Medical School) to train a new breed of military medical personnel capable of providing medical care to the soldiers as well as preventing the outbreak of diseases along the lines and in military camps. Unfortunately, the army medical service in the late 1920s and early 1930s was in a state of disarray and plagued by problems such as inadequate funding, substandard training, lack of medicines and equipment, poor organization and coordination, low status, factionalism, and no clear identity with nationalistic goals. Reform attempts in the 1930s under the Nationalists failed, however, to address many of these problems. The national war of resistance provided an opportunity for the leaders to use the upsurge in nationalism and the relocation of schools --which resulted in the “mixing” of students and teachers from different parts of the country-- to forge a new identity for the school as well as the creation of a new type of medical personnel dedicated to national goals. Their status would be elevated through rigid discipline and rigorous training in modern preventive and curative practices. This paper analyzes the evolution of the medical school before and during the war against Japan. It evaluates the nature of the medical education, as well as the process of training—medical and political—carried out in the school. Moreover, it examines the leaders responsible for the education of the new military doctors and how they utilized the war effort to further the development of modern medical services in China.

**Odoric Y.K. Wou**

“National Salvation and Early Wartime Mobilization of the Red Spears in Henan.”

The initial phase (roughly 1937 to 1940) of the Sino-Japanese War was a period of intense nationalism in China. Both student activists in the urban centers and the peasantry in the countryside were deeply engulfed by this patriotic sentiment and became united in a national effort to resist Japanese aggression. The “national salvation” movement, or jiuwang yundong as it was called, was supposed to be a single unitary movement. As Presenjit Duara points out, nationalism is a multi-layered phenomenon. The concept of national salvation had different layers of meaning for different groups of people in different regions, depending on the urgency of the political crisis at that particular political juncture and in that particular locality. Intellectuals in different regions frequently constructed their particularistic nationalistic themes and identities to fit their specific forms of national struggle in that locality at that time.
The first part of this paper traces the political and military development in the first two years of the resistance war in Henan and the Chinese Communist Party policies of wartime grassroots mobilization. It examines how elite students in the province constructed a discourse linking the national with sub-national (regional and local) units as a theme in their narrative of armed resistance against Japan. What kind of nationalistic rhetoric the Henanese intellectuals employ to integrate the particularistic regional/local movements with the broader national resistance movement? How did elite activists build a sense of awareness of a national unity among the Henan citizens and villagers?

The second part of this paper focuses on mobilization of the rural classes in the national salvation movement. It contrasts two different experiences of mobilizing the local Red Spears by the CCP-inspired activists. The paper traces the success and failure of these two cases in an attempt to understand the tension between articulation of the lofty ideals of patriotism by the elite students and the political reality they confronted in the actual grassroots mobilization. Hopefully, this paper will provide us with a better knowledge of the regional sociopolitical factors that helped to facilitate and hinder the CCP sectarian mobilization in wartime Henan.

Huaiyin Li

“State Discourse and Village Politics in Early Twentieth-Century North China: Evidence from Huailu County, Hebei Province”

An important aspect of the rebuilding of local identities in the course of modern state-making in early twentieth-century China is the penetration of a hegemonic nationalist/modern-legal discourse into local communities to undermine, replace, or coexist with indigenous notions of legitimacy and to reshape the local process of legitimation. Focusing on Huailu county, Hebei Province, this paper explores how the villagers’ changing perceptions of legitimacy fashioned their strategies for disputes over village office and other public matters during the Republican years. The first part of the paper examines the villagers’ representations of their disputes over the village-head position during the 1910s and the 1920s. It is shown that what justified the holding or renunciation of the office was not merely the traditional values embedded in village communities that stressed the reputation and personalities of the leaders. Equally important were the “modern” ideas introduced from outside, which emphasized the officeholder’s abilities, appropriate age, and most importantly, the legitimacy of his election to the office. The change was also evident in the villagers’ notion about how village leaders should exercise their power. While old assumptions about the pervasive influence of the privileged in community life remained alive, equally powerful was the state-imposed idea about functional differentiation among village offices. The second part of the paper discusses village politics in the Kuomintang era. Here again profound changes are evident in the way people perceived what was legitimate and articulated their concerns. Instead of adhering to local regulations indigenous to their communities when involved in disputes, the villagers embraced formal institutions imposed nationally. Their acceptance of the supremacy of legal codes and legal principles in
public debate during the 1930s is evidence that the state systems and discourses slowly yet steadily penetrated rural communities to reshape local identities.

Panel B
Ethnic Nationalism and Overseas Chinese

Elena Barabantseva
‘Domestic Cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Ethnic Internationalism’ in China’s Socialist Nation-Building

From the moment of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) creation, followed by the power struggle with the Guomindang and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the new communist government under the leadership of Mao Zedong embarked on the socialist building project by ‘uniting’ a broad range of revolutionary forces into the United Front. The activities of the United Front were directed at building a new socialist China. The discursive framework within which the socialist nation-state project unfolded was the amorphous class-defined concept of the People which united the revolutionary elements and served as a denominator of a human collectivity with a common goal. The implementation of the shared goal of constructing socialism was prioritised over other unifying elements, such as territory, political and ethnic identity. As such, the character of the national project was not defined or limited by the territorial boundaries, and cannot be fully understood within their limits. Instead, it is suggested in the paper that the examination of the policies which were carried out under the banner of the United Front could illuminate the nature of China’s socialist national project.

This paper considers the roles of the two immediate participant groups in the United Front whose loyalty and allegiance the Party was religiously seeking to win — Chinese minority nationalities and overseas Chinese. The paper discusses how the CCP managed its overseas Chinese’ and ethnic minorities’ directions of policies in the period of socialist construction in China and examines the roles of these groups in China’s socialist nation-building. On the one hand, the objective is to examine identity politics of the Communist regime towards minority populations and how they were integrated or forced into the United Front of socialist nation-building. On the other hand, the paper examines how identity politics was played out in relation to the overseas Chinese who had been regarded as an extension of China, that is as its trans-territorial nationals, since the adoption of a Law of Nationality by the Qing dynasty in 1909. By the politics of identity I refer to the ways of promoting sentiments of belonging to the newly established Chinese communist state among Chinese minority populations and overseas Chinese. Therefore, I will look at how the idea of a unified Chinese nation-state was propagated and implemented among the ethnic minorities and overseas Chinese, and what roles these two groups were assigned to play in the process of socialist nation-building.
To capture the nature of the PRC’s policies towards ethnic minorities and overseas Chinese the terms ‘domestic cosmopolitanism’ and ‘ethnic internationalism’ are introduced. I demonstrate that the CCP’s strategy towards ethnic minorities was aimed at their detachment from the localised and fixed allegiances that conflicted with the Party’s interpretation of patriotic elements. These endeavours of the Party to extricate minority nationalities from their local attachments are viewed as cosmopolitan practices within China’s territorial delimitations. In contrast, in pursuit of policies towards overseas Chinese China adhered to the problematically combined principles of ethnic nationalism and internationalism. China had to balance between finding a way of sustaining the communist regime economically – and overseas Chinese and their considerable funds provided a partial solution to it – and being recognised as a legitimate regime internationally. These policies of utilising ethnic links while nominally respecting other states’ sovereignty are termed ‘ethnic internationalism’.

Steven Phillips

Mothers of the Revolution: The Nationalists and Huaqiao Mobilization during the 1950s

We know a great deal about the Nationalists’ attempts to mobilize huaqiao to begin a revolution on the mainland, but less about their efforts to save their revolution on Taiwan. Sun Yat-sen, then Jiang Jieshi, benefited from the changing political consciousness of overseas Chinese, who were often deemed the “mothers of the revolution” (geming zhi mu), even as each sought to amplify and channel nationalist sentiment. The legacy of 1911 and Sun’s fruitful ties to overseas Chinese became a model for the Nationalists after their humiliating withdrawal to Taiwan. In many ways, the Nationalists attempted to revive what remembered as their most successful experience at marshalling support for a new struggle that was not easily placed into a nationalist context. It proved difficult to claim that Jiang’s party and state represented the sole legitimate forces behind a revolution when Mao Zedong’s regime controlled all but one province. Nevertheless, overseas Chinese were courted so that they could help preserve the Nationalists’ international legitimacy, boost morale on Taiwan, lobby other nations to recognize the government in Taibei, and provide investment and donations. This paper will examine Nationalist policies and rhetoric designed to reinvigorate huaqiao activism in a Cold War context.

Nationalist efforts offer an opportunity to see one vision of the Chinese nation. Wang Gungwu writes that the Nationalists and the Communists deemed overseas Chinese “targets for resinicization” during the Cold War. Both parties attempted to define China to overseas Chinese, particularly those in Southeast Asia. “China” was not static, but represented a combination of long-held political, cultural, and social values and symbols; the political ideology that underpinned each party’s world view; and Machiavellian expediency. Jiang’s regime in exile had to convince a diverse huaqiao community that it was fighting an alien ideology, if not an invading army. The Communists had to be “de-sinified”, shown to hold values inimical to those held by real Chinese, and under the control of hated foreigners, in
this case the Russians. Further, the Nationalists had to prove that they offered a legitimate avenue for Chinese overseas to participate in the political life of their fatherland. In short, the world would have to accept that Taiwan had become China. The Nationalists’ agenda became clear in a slight modification of Sun’s famous statement. Scholar and Minister of Education Zhang Qiyun noted that “Huaqiao wei Zhonghua minguo zhi mu” (Overseas Chinese are the mother of the Republic of China), thus evoking a powerful historical memory and connecting overseas Chinese to the regime in exile.

Materials from the Party’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, newspapers, memoirs, and officials documents from the United States and British archives all illustrate the Nationalists’ struggle to preserve their legitimacy as representative of the Chinese nation.

Huei-ying Kuo

Divided Chinese Communities in United Homeland Ties: Chinese Bourgeois Nationalism in the Hong Kong-Singapore Corridor

This paper applies and revisits Benedict Anderson’s concepts of imagined communities and “long-distance nationalism” to examine the Chinese bourgeois nationalism in Hong Kong and Singapore in the 1930s. Anderson argues that nationalism is an intellectual artifact that mobilizes people living abroad to identify with their “homeland.” My study shows that ethnic Chinese bourgeoisie in Hong Kong and Singapore had their own rationale to respond to the nationalist calls.

In the 1930s, Chinese nationalist rhetoric became an important economic asset that bourgeoisie of different sub-ethnic backgrounds (demarcated along dialect and native-place origins) used in their business competition. Chinese sub-ethnic ties facilitated Chinese nationalist movements to spread from China to abroad, but competition among different dialect groups having diverse economic interests divided the unity of this nationalist movement. Chinese nationalist movements were mobilized in a transnational framework along sub-ethnic lines. The pursuit of the pan-Chinese solidarity did not surmount the tenacious sub-ethnic cleavages.

On the one hand, this paper, from the perspective of policies toward women, brings to light the background and goals of the relevant policies that were implemented by the GMD, and then analyzes the characteristics and essence of the Party. On the other hand, it examines the outcomes of the implementation of these policies, and investigates the interactive relationship between the nation and the Party, on one hand, and women and authority, on the other.

Huang Jianli

Dynamics at the Periphery of the Chinese Nation: Historiography on Overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution

One notable trend in recent scholarship is the de-centring of China and the celebration of its margins. There is now a richer body of publications approaching Chinese history through the studies of frontier regions and minority
people. Casting his arguments along the line of core versus periphery, Tu Wei-
ming in *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Being Chinese Today* (1994) has even
proposed taking the reversed position of having the “Periphery as the Centre” in
our comprehension of “Cultural China”. This paper examines the historiography
on links between Overseas Chinese of the not-so-distant Southeast Asia (especially
Singapore and Malaya) and the tumultuous 1911 Revolution which led to the
ousting of the Qing emperor and ending of the 2000-year imperial institution.
Empirical evidences on such linkages are not difficult to uncover as the exiled Sun
Yat Sen and his banned republican revolutionary movement had indeed been
forced to operate only around the edges of the Chinese empire. Consequently, the
Overseas Chinese in one strand of Kuomintang orthodox writings had been
centred as the “Mother of the Chinese Revolution 华侨为 革命之母”. However,
this exalted position and the perceived magnitude of such contribution from the
margins have come under challenge in revisionist writings from the 1970s to 1990s.
The commemorative literature which celebrated the anniversaries of the 1911
Revolution prove to be especially useful as a window to view such
historiographical changes. Similarly, the role played by the Singapore Chinese
intellectual and business community in contributing to shifting interpretations is
also a subject worthy of examination.

Session 7
June 28, 9:30-11:30

Panel A

Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in China during the Early Twentieth Century

Jianhua Chen

Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and Popular Culture: Zhou Shoujuan’s Love
Stories in Shanghai in the 1910s-1920s

In his influential book *Revolution and Cosmopolitanism*, Joseph Levenson
asserted that modern China had been dominated by the ideologies of nationalism
and cosmopolitanism represented by the Nationalist Party (GMD) and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) respectively. This assertion, albeit its insight, was limited
in the political and intellectual realms, and yet ignored other important ideological
realms such as the popular literature and culture flowering in urban centers,
characteristic of everyday modernity complicatedly ramified with nationalism and
cosmopolitanism.

This paper focuses on Zhou Shoujuan, one of the most popular “Butterfly” writers
in Shanghai in the 1910s and 1920s. An investigation of his love stories of the
period will reveal that they represent urban desires paradoxically entangled with
nationalistic and cosmopolitan ideologies, defying the conventional wisdom that his works are cheap tear-jerkers aimed at commercial successes.

His strong nationalistic ethos was embedded in his childhood trauma due to his father’s death when the Allies invaded Beijing in 1900. Yet his belief in the universal love was not only nurtured by the native sentimental-erotic fiction, but also inspired by cosmopolitan sources such as European Romantic literature, Christian spirituality, Hollywood cinema, and British and American popular culture.

Qian Suoqiao

Imperialism, Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism and the Liberal Difference

This study will deepen our understanding of ideological complexity in modern China. And it may raise the issue: How should today’s intellectuals reflect on the relations between the empire, the nation, and the world that are deeply entangled with the mass culture dominant in our present global situation?

Yung-chên Chiang

“Above All Nations Is Humanity”: Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Hu Shi (1891-1962)

In this paper, I will first engage contemporary Western critical concerns over cosmopolitanism and then re-orient it in the context of Chinese modernity. The interplay between imperialism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism constituted the defining element in shaping Chinese modernity. I will show that Chinese modernity can be approached on three dimensions: the socio-political, the socio-cultural and the cultural-aesthetic. The socio-political is concerned with the (re-)construction of a new nation-state against imperialist encroachment, as actualized in nationalist (as well as communist, in practice to a large extent) revolutions. The socio-cultural, as exemplified in the “New Culture Movement,” offers a predominantly cosmopolitan discourse aimed at a cultural revolution to achieve socio-political means. What has been usually overlooked is the cultural-aesthetic dimension that offers a cosmopolitan aesthetics that brackets the imperialist/nationalist double and refocuses on questions of self and identity in one’s everyday practices in a rapidly modernizing and globalizing society.

I will single out three phases of Hu Shi’s career for an in-depth analysis in this paper. The first phase spanned from 1910 to 1917 when he was a student in the United States, which marked the transformation of him from a nationalist to a zealous cosmopolitan. The second phase lasted from 1931 to 1937, which witnessed Japan’s aggression that began with the occupation of Manchuria in that year and culminated in an all-out invasion of China in 1937. During this period, Hu was hard pressed to defend his cosmopolitanism and was often maligned as an appeaser. The last phase began in 1937 and ended in 1945. He left for the United States after the outbreak of the war with Japan to serve as Chiang Kai-shek’s special envoy and then to become China’s ambassador to the United States from 1938-1942. While the cosmopolitan had become a spokesperson for U.S. aid for
China’s war efforts against Japan, he must have found himself vindicated when he participated as a Chinese delegate in the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. Soon, however, civil war broke out in China that would embroil him in an ideological struggle with the Communist regime from which he was not destined to extract himself.

KAWAJIRI Fumihiko

Modern China and Du Contrat social: How did Chinese intellectuals understand Du Contrat social

Du Contrat social was very influential to intellectual world in modern Japan and China. In 1880s, a Japanese scholar Nakae Chomin translated it into classic Japanese. It is clear that some Chinese intellectuals used the Japanese translation. In later nineteenth, LIANG Chichao referred to Rousseau in his essay and introduce Du Contrat social very briefly. In early twenties, Chinese young revolutionaries in Japan referred Du Contrat social to advocate their revolutionary theories. But, by that time, LIANG Chichao abandoned Rousseau theory. On the other hand, LIU Shibei wrote about the essence of Du Contrat social in a very classic way. In 1910s, Yan Fu criticized Du Contrat social very severely. Chinese intellectuals’ understandings about Du Contrat social were very varied and complicated. I intend to make it clear and interpret it in the context of intellectual history at that time.

Panel B

The Politics of Heritage and History

Parks M. Coble

China at War, 1937-1945: Remembering and Re-remembering China’s War of Resistance

Six decades have passed since the guns fell silent with Japan’s defeat in World War II. In most of the combatant nations the public memory of the war is confined to ceremonies on special holidays when the few remaining veterans are honored. In China, however, the legacy of the war is a volatile, public issue. A quick perusal of front page headlines in the Chinese press in the past few months would suggest that the memory of the war remains very much a live issue. In April 2005, anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in several major cities, protesting the treatment of the war in public school textbooks in Japan. Both the Japanese embassy in Beijing and the Japanese consulate in Shanghai were damaged. The incident became a serious diplomatic matter between the two nations.

The irony is that as visible as the issue of the war legacy is today, for much of the history of the People’s Republic of China—the Maoist years—the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance almost disappeared from public view. Only the resistance led by Chairman Mao was praised, other memories were “forgotten.” The heroic stand of
Chiang Kaishek and the Nationalist military at Shanghai; the victory at Taierzhuang, or the role of the Flying Tigers were simply not part of the public discourse. When the war was mentioned at all during the Maoist years, the “China as victor” approach dominated. Little mention was made of Japanese atrocities even including the famous “Rape of Nanjing [Nanking].

After the death of Chairman Mao and the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping as China’s paramount leader, a new and very public interest in the war and its legacy appeared in China. The volume of publications increased dramatically while the subject matter which they covered began to change. From the 1980s until the present, the legacy of the war of resistance has thus re-surfaced from near total obscurity in China and the focus has shifted to China as victim. An enormous volume of publications has appeared particularly on such topics as the Rape of Nanjing. The “new remembering” of the war in China is a politically constructed memory designed to foster a sense of nationalism in today’s China. With the failing appeal of Communist ideology in China, the leadership in Beijing has increasingly turned to nationalism as a source of legitimacy for its rule.

As a consequence, despite the enormous volume of publications which have emerged on the Sino-Japanese War, understanding the experience of those who lived through this event is perhaps as difficult as ever. The goal of this paper is to first examine some of the main themes in the original “memory” of the war as it was created by journalists and war reporters during the war itself. Secondly, the paper will examine how these memories of the war have been recast in the “new remembering” to fit the needs of today’s nationalism. Both through reprints of original materials in edited form and in memoir recollections, the memory of the war which is so public in today’s China, has recast dramatically the ways in which people thought about the war at the time. The new remembering thus helps us understand the changing face of nationalism in today’s China.

Yu SHEN

‘Let History Serve the Present’: Bases of Patriotic Education in China.

In August 1994, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a document, calling on the nation to pay attention to “patriotic education”. The focus of this patriotic education, as the document explains, is the adolescents. In fact, the document maintains that patriotic education should be conducted from kindergarten all the way through to university. This clearly indicates the government’s concern with the lack of patriotism, especially among the younger generations. In 1996, after more than a year of intensive discussion and preparation, six government agencies jointly publicized a list of places that have been named as the national bases of patriotic education for elementary and high school students. In 1997, Ministry of Propaganda issued the first hundred patriotic education demonstration bases. Eight years later, there are two hundred patriotic education bases at the national level and thousands more at the provincial and local levels.

This paper attempts to explore the context in which this policy of establishing patriotic education bases was formulated, examine the process of selecting the
bases, and investigate the value of using the bases for patriotic education. At the core of my inquiry is the issue of how the Chinese government dresses up history and fits it into a political agenda of indoctrinating its young. For my research material, I will rely on government documents, interviews of people who are responsible for selecting and approving the educational bases, and publicized material advertising and promoting these bases. I propose to focus on a few cases and scrutinize them closely to achieve an in-depth understanding of how these bases operate and how the managers of these bases manipulate history to satisfy the party’s agenda.

Tong Lam

The Politics of Cultural Heritage: Imagining the Colonial Past and Global Future in Post-Socialist China

Since the 1985 when China first joined the “UNESCO Convention on the Protection of world Cultural and Natural Heritage,” it has successfully registered over thirty heritage sites with UNESCO, demonstrating its desire to become a so-called “world heritage powerhouse nation” [shiyi daiguo 世遺大國]. Meanwhile, approximately another one hundred sites have been submitted to the central government for consideration. Since UNESCO has altered its regulations recently, allowing only one cultural heritage site from each nation to be added to its official list annually, it would take another century for China to just clear the existing backlog.

Significantly, while cultural heritage has become a Chinese national obsession, there is no one single coherent force behind this new movement. Motivated by economic interests, local pride, and nationalism, contending parties such as local authorities, business corporations, scholars, environmental advocates, ethnic minority groups, and the central government all participated in the production of Chinese cultural heritage for global and domestic consumption. Together, they revisit ancient myths, rewrite local histories, and even redefine local jurisdictions, producing competing narratives about local and national cultures and histories.

Not surprisingly, the heritage sites central to their debates involve not just natural wonders and mythical stories of the remote past. They often implicate the nation’s traumatic modern history. For instance, when the western-style colonial buildings along the Bund in Shanghai was submitted to the central government for consideration, opponents fervidly questioned the Chineseness of this site, calling it a symbol of national humiliation rather than cultural pride. Local supporters of the site, on the contrary, pointed to its symbolic meanings of cultural hybridity and global capitalism. Therefore, instead of emphasizing the victimhood of the nation, their central concerns were the city’s rising financial industry, real estate values, tourism, and middle class consumers. For them, the registration of the Bund as a Chinese and world cultural heritage of China was also the perfect occasion to articulate the emerging global status of the city. Meanwhile, for officials from the central government, the Bund exemplified the progressive nature of the Han Chinese population. Specifically, they used the material progress of China’s emerging global city to contrast the “intangible cultural heritage” of China’s ethnic
minorities, amplifying the role of the Han Chinese population to preserve China’s minority cultures.

In short, by examining the officials and civic discourses on cultural heritage, and analyzing how cultural heritage has become a site to produce and renegotiated new historical meanings under the imperatives of nationalism and global capitalism, this paper will address two of the rubrics concerning this conference, namely, the “Changing Faces of Nationalism” and “New China and the World.” As such, it is simultaneously a study of end-of-the-20th-century China as well as a study of China’s latest attempt to rewrite its recent past.

Brian Moloughney

Good and Popular History: Rewriting the nation’s story

The questions that lie at the heart of this paper were ones that preoccupied China’s historians in the early twentieth-century as they tried to manage the transition from fragmenting empire to nation state: how was it possible to move from writing the story of a dynastic enterprise to constructing a nation’s history; how could they tell the national story in a way that would give meaning to the inherited cultural legacy yet also help them shape the emerging nation? In particular, I will focus on the way these challenges were met through the reshaping of general history, or tongshi, so that it might speak to the new audience created by increased literacy and the new education system. While I will consider a range of these new general histories, my main focus will be on one book, Zhang Yinlin’s Early China.

Session 8
June 28, 12:30-2:30

Panel A

Transformation of economic institutions

Pan Xiaoxia

The Bankruptcy Mechanism of the Chinese Traditional Financial Institution: A Study of Qianzhuang and Pianhao bankruptcy in late Qing Dynasty and early Republic

The Bankruptcy Mechanism is an indispensable procedure for the enterprise system to run healthily. From the late Qing Dynasty to early Republican, there were great many enterprises bankrupted. While paying general attention to modern enterprise system, most scholars ignore the bankrupt system in studying enterprise system. This paper mean to fill this blank by study the bankruptcy mechanism of the late Qing dynasty and early Republican. During the period, there were mainly two bankruptcy tides: one occurred around 1883 and the other happened around 1910. I’ll take the bankruptcy of Qianzhuang, Piaohao, as examples to study the
enterprise’s actual working system and try to discover the bankruptcy procedure of Chinese traditional financial organization, how it announced the bankruptcy and deal with it thereafter technically.

Wang Luman
New Perspectives on the rise and decline of Shanxi piaohao

Panel B
New woman for a new China

Zhou Lei
Nation, Party and Women – Research into the New Life Movement in the Women’s Sphere （1934-1945）

研究的目的及意义:
以社会性别的视角来分析考察历史事件，是以一个比较新的领域. 而一般都认为，性别的研究与政治，权力没有关系，主要只是研究女性. 事实上，国家政策与性别之间的关系是密切相连的. 国家政策从来就不是在真空中制定出来的，它一定是在具体的文化中，根据现实条件和当时当地的具体情况来制定的. 在这些具体的条件和情况中，性别意识总是有形无形地影响到政策的走向，政策也影响了两性的地位和关系.

近年来，新生活运动的研究逐渐引起海内外学人越来越多的关注，其着眼点主要偏重于政治，文化层面，较少关注新生活运动对女性的规定和要求，女性地位的变化以及女性对新运的感受等问题. 在三十年代国民党所发动的新生活运动，针对女性推行了一系列的政策，并触及到女性生活最基本的层面.

新生活运动历时时间长，从1934年发起到1945年抗战的结束而终结，经历了国民党剿共，日本侵华和全民族抗战等大的历史事件. 在这个复杂的历史场景中，通过对新生活运动的分析，考察当时国家的执政党——国民党如何组织和动员女性，如何按照其方式对女性进行规定，限制和倡导，使得政治与女性紧密地联系起来. 而这些直接关系到了女性自身的利益，对中国传统的性别制度产生了影响. 从这个视角，也可以分析国民党在构建现代化国家的方式和理念.

从妇女史的角度来说，对中国共产党领导下的妇女运动研究得比较多，而国民党统治下的妇女的研究不多，由于受意识形态等原因的影响，往往笼统地认为国民党统治下的妇女生活十分痛苦，她们除了受男性受同等的压迫外，更要受家庭的压迫与男子的支配. 通过对此事件的分析，可以探究
在国民党统治区域中，中国妇女的地位和状况。二十世纪三四十年代国共两党对峙，以往的学术研究一般只关注到了两党间的斗争和对立，很少关注二者的相似之处。从对妇女政策的角度，可以对二者作比较，考察其在规定女性、建构国家社会秩序的异同点，进而探讨两党推动中国近代化历程中不同的特色。

文章的结构:

第一部分妇女界新生活运动发起的背景:

国民党的妇女政策历史回顾:

妇女界新生活运动的兴起（原因）:

第二部分抗日战争前妇女界的新生活运动1934-1937

1.对妇女的组织和发动;

2.有关妇女的具体政策:“规定、提倡与禁止”

第三部分:抗日战争时期的妇女界新生活运动

抗日战争的爆发与新生活运动重心的转变

抗战新生活运动对妇女的组织和动员

新生活运动的结束

第四部分:总结

新生活运动对妇女的影响，妇女的参与及其所起的作用:

国民党对妇女政策的特点，并与同一时期共产党的有关政策作比较.

资料搜集:

主要从 荆棘 历史档案馆、三四十年相关的书刊、杂志以及报纸等方面搜集资料.

Song Shaopeng

Nationalism and Feminism: Constructing of Female Individual Citizenship and building of Image of Nation-Station in early modern china

Feminism and nationalism are the two sides of pursuing modernity in Modern China. Chinese women movement has been deeply involved into nationalism movement. My paper discusses that nationalism block feminism. My paper analyzes the inherent logics of two concepts of Natural Right and Nation-State, which created new discourses and images of society and state.

Natural Right（天赋人权） means female and male is equal and equal right. And the Tian (天)in Chinese traditional cultural has ultimate sovereignty, which can beyond the secular authority. Traditional dynasty state is based on a social structure
of family-state, female has no individual identity in public sphere and only has Minfen (名分) in family: daughter, related to parents; wife, related to husband; daughter-in-law, related to parents-in-law; mother, related to children. Nation-state is based on a social structure of individual-state and the ownership of the state is belonging to all state-members. So when the concepts of Natural Right and nation-state have been introduced into China, which created a new discourse space and political space for female. Female can beyond family and create direct relationship with nation-state and obtain individual identity --- female state-member (女国民).

So, it is possible for feminists to build the individual identity by participate construct the nationalism discourses. I will present male discourses and female discourses on women rights in the end of Qing Dynasty to analyze the same and difference between two. So, I think female feminists strategically used the male mainstream discourses and its nationalism approach. The female subject and subjectivity can be built by constructing the discourse on “women were the citizens and take the same responsibility as male” and female get the equal status as male under the procedure of state -building. My opinion is that Chinese nationalism created opportunity for Chinese feminism, not only the feminism and nationalism as the two important sections of Modernity are the same building procedure. but also feminism as the important section of nation-state building emerged in the modern china.

The Chinese feminist experiences should be understood under the Chinese history context. Because Chinese feminism happened in the procedure of nation-stating building, “equal possibility “----which is very different from “equal right “of western feminism because western women movement happened in the nation state which had been built -- become the Chinese feminism characteristic at the beginning of the Chinese women movement and at the same time limit the approach of Chinese women movement in the whole 20th century. On the one hand, the Chinese feminism can easily get the male support and made an alliance with male because the same enemies are the patriarchal fathers (tradition) and foreign invaders. On the another hand, the Chinese feminism with “equal possibility” focus on the state, so it is possibility that nationalism cover up the feminism and hardly develop independently social movement

**Greg Rohlf**

“Resettlement of Women and State Building in Western China”

Asia’s “missing girls” have been the subject of a heated and ongoing debate in the press and academy over gender inequality in China and India. The problem is a gross violation of the human rights of Chinese girls that must be addressed at its root in Chinese culture. The implications of the “marriage squeeze” and other dimensions of the female shortage will be faced by the people and government of China for many years to come.

But the current female shortage is not a new problem. Women were in shortage during the Qing dynasty for the same reasons they are today. Of greater interest for this paper was the female shortage in parts of western China in the 1950s and 1960s, a deficit that was caused by transfers of mostly Han Chinese males.
Qinghai province was on the receiving end of largely male population transfers in the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, in-migration continued at lower levels but the gender balance of in- and out-migration shifted. Official population figures show that the population of Han women grew faster than the Han male population in the 1960s and 1970s despite ongoing male resettlement and sex ratios at birth that favored males. The faster rate of growth for Han women is therefore most likely the result of population transfers to Qinghai, rather than births or deaths. One can also see evidence of population transfers of women in the 1960s and 1970s in two middle-aged cohorts of Qinghai’s urban population in 2000 that are dominated by females. Specifically, Qinghai’s municipalities (Xining, Golmud and Delingha) show cohorts missing 10,000 - 12,000 middle-aged men who are unlikely to have died or been killed. I suspect that this bulge in the numbers of women in Xining has been produced by population transfers and that it reflects a state policy to adjust the imbalanced gender ratios it had created in the 1950s.

Session 9
June 28, 4:00-6:00

Panel A
China and the World – 1949 to present

Yinghong Cheng
Maoism and Castroism: A Comparison from Global Perspective

My project examines the similarities between Maoism and Castroism, reflected in China’s Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution and Cuba’s Revolutionary Offensive in particular, as an approach to assess the Chinese revolution from a global perspective.

In 1969, Castro said, “If we did something similar to the Chinese communists, it was an accident of history.” Castro was referring to some apparent similarities between Cuba’s ongoing Revolutionary Offensive (1968-1970) and many of Maoist policies and practices in China, which can be summarized below:

1) Revolutionary voluntarism that places “subjective elements” above “objective conditions”, in practice meaning revolutionary determination and devotion personified by political elites can offset the economic and technological shortcomings in making the revolution and transforming the society; 2) A direct communication and interaction between the charismatic leader and the masses and the aversion to party and state bureaucracy as medium between the two; 3) Reliance upon mass mobilization and political campaign instead of institutionalized system and routine methods in solving economic problems; 4) Anti-intellectualism which distrusts the intellectuals not only for their ideological conformity and moral integrity, but also for the credibility of their knowledge; 5) Promoting moral instead of material incentives in determining compensation, significantly restricting
and even eliminating market mechanism, private sector and self-budgeting elements; 6) Applying military methods in organizing the society, the labor force, and economic production, even putting the entire society under forged war situations to stimulate people’s militancy; 7) Critique of the Soviet Union for its revisionist domestic policies and international strategy of “peaceful co-existence” with the West; 8) Finally, creating a selfless “new men” who would perpetuate the revolutionary spirit in the time of peace and create material miracles with their revolutionary consciousness.

The high point of these similarities came in Castro’s Revolutionary Offensive from 1968 to 1970. From a Maoist perspective, the campaign seems to compress the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution into one stage. Economically it set up an unrealistic economic goal to produce 10 million tons of sugar and the whole labor force was mobilized and plunged into this battle. All private businesses were eliminated and the owners were rounded up and sent to reeducation camps. The intellectuals and students suspended their studies and were sent down to the cane fields and other sites of production (as a matter of fact the integration of work and study at all levels of education—the essence of Maoist educational revolution—had gone in Cuba since the early 1960s). Military officers took over civilian positions nationwide to ensure the campaign’s success. When the campaign started, there was also a “revisionist clique” in the party’s central committee who were exposed and purged.

Regardless the absences of some essentially Maoist characteristics of the Cultural Revolution, such as gang warfare and large-scale political persecutions within the ranks of cadres and intellectuals, this Chinese/Cuban parallel reveals a common twofold goal of Maoist and Castroist revolutions. The first was to telescope developmental stages defined by classical Marxism by exploring a shortcut toward communism. It was not just to surpass the Soviet Union in material terms, but even more so to avoid the pitfall of the Soviet experience of revolutionary spirit compromised by economic development. The second was to set an example for the Third World for their nation-building, in both economic and ideological terms, that an underdeveloped country could modernize itself by appealing to people’s consciousness and relying on mobilization instead of material rewards and economic/technological footings.

Nicolai VOLLAND


Soon after the founding of the PRC, the CCP-led nation-state moved to redefine the country’s identity by integrating China into the larger framework of the socialist world. Exchanges and contacts in the cultural sphere played a key role in constructing the vision of a Moscow-centered world order.

This paper examines the role of one professional group working in the cultural sector, literary translators, in the process of making China part of this construct, the socialist world order. As highly-skilled specialists, translators in the past had
enjoyed much freedom to choose the books they wanted to translate, books that in turn made a significant impact on the way China defined herself. After 1949, these translators found themselves confronted with the proliferation of the party-state’s sovereignty claims into the cultural sphere and had to adapt to a new function.

I argue that instead of merely submitting to the government, however, the role of translators in the early PRC was much more ambiguous: as cultural brokers, they depended on the party-state’s goodwill as much as the CCP needed them. The official ideology, as well as the political and economic system that was built in the PRC after 1949, ultimately were products of cultural transfer and translation. So while the Party tried to dictate the choice of works for translation and the language in which these were to be rendered, literary translators retained a significant degree of agency that allowed them to negotiate their own convictions with those of the Party’s cultural bureaucrats.

What enabled them to maintain a degree of autonomy was precisely their privileged position in a tremendous (yet almost never studied) institutional and organizational network of cultural exchanges that spanned the entire socialist world from East Berlin to Pyongyang, from Warsaw to Hanoi, a framework that included, next to mutual translation of literature, the exchange of scholars and artists, stipends for young painters and musicians, contacts of youth organizations, etc. The simultaneous translation into dozens of Eastern European and Asian languages of novels like Ostrovsky’s *How the Steel was Tempered*, for example, served as much to create a uniform vision of the socialist world, as to bolster the legitimacy of the new regimes in cultural terms. Translators, I argue, thus occupied a mediating middle position in this complex, serving both the purposes of redefining national identity and the formation of a transnational vision – a position that refocused their self-understanding but also sheltered them being consumed by the party-state’s power projections in the cultural sphere.

In this paper, which is related to a larger research project on translators and their interaction with the state in twentieth-century China, I propose to reconstruct the institutional and organizational landscape of cultural exchanges in the socialist world, to outline the experience of one group of Shanghai-based translators in the transitional period before and after 1949, and to relate these findings to both their national (institution-building in the PRC) and international (Cold War) context. Thus, I hope to attain a more complete picture of the political/cultural and national/international dynamics that were at work in shaping the identity of the PRC in its founding years.

Dooeum CHUNG

Investment in China by South Koreans in Perspective

It is about one hundred and fifty years ago that one of the greatest adventures the world had ever seen took place in California, the “Gold Rush”. Reminiscence of the 1849 gold rush fever in California may cross our minds when thinking about today’s China and foreigners rushing to China.
Assuming that foreign direct investment is the main driving force behind China's flourishing economy, the rush of many South Korean companies to invest in China is being discussed. Given the probable ad hoc decisions by Korean business, both small and corporate, to go west one can hardly escape the “Digging Gold” fever that underlies this.

After the 1911 revolution there were a few serious attempts by Chinese governments to attract “foreign money” into China. Today, the PRC (Peoples Republic of China) is again concentrating its endeavours to improve the situation of China and the Chinese people by attracting foreign capital into the country. One may conclude that this closely mirrors efforts in the 1920s and 30s to improve the Chinese economy.

One of the remarkable features of Chinese thinking is that concepts are often dualized. A recent example would be the slogan of Premier Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s: “One country, two systems. China, while keeping up its socialist profile, is pushing forward with capitalism as is represented by the introduction of the market mechanism and private ownership.

China has now been under Communist rule for over fifty years. In 1978, China committed itself to economic reform and open-door policies. Since then it has promoted domestic structural reform, switched to a market economy, and actively encouraged foreign investment. Since then China has made extraordinary progress and, since economic reforms began 200 million or more people were pulled out of absolute poverty. Raising living standards for hundreds and hundreds of millions more people, and giving them opportunities that would have been unimaginable a generation ago, is one of the greatest success stories of economic development in history.

China has come to enjoy an exceptional economic growth rate that has averaged nearly 10 percent per annum since the economic reform process started in the late 1970s. One of the factors that have made such progress possible is the virtually unlimited supply of labor. Links of Korea with China go back centuries, but after the Korean War, when the Korean peninsula was divided into North and South, diplomatic relations with the South were broken off and communist North Korea became its natural ally. However, since diplomatic relations again were formalized in 1992 the China-South Korea relations increased steadily. In recent years China has developed into South Korea’s most important export market and, at the same time South Korea has effectively emerged as the world’s biggest investor in China. Now, there is a real China craze going on in South Korea and one may worry that the countries economic attraction to China has blinded Koreans to Beijing’s long term strategic aims.

Dora Martins

Chinese Foreign Policy to East Asia: Current driving forces

Since the end of the cold war, important changes took place in international society and also in Chinese domestic policy. After the Tian’anmen Square events, China felt internationally isolated and had to adopt a different orientation in foreign
policy regarding principles and also partners. The third and forth generation of Chinese leaders then came with the “new security concept” (xin anquan guan) and “China’s peaceful rise” (zhongguo heping jueqi) or “China’s peaceful development” (zhongguo heping fazhan) respectively.

Furthermore, China opposes to a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower and always emphasizes the need to promote a multipolar world. To avoid dependence on a single superpower, Beijing decided to promote the diversification of partners and stared to look carefully to Asia, strengthening relations and promoting a peaceful environment. Peace and development are indeed the major principles in Chinese Foreign Policy since the end of Cold War because Chinese government realized it can only develop on a peaceful environment. And Chinese development will promote regional development and also world development according to Chinese leaders.

Although until the end of the 1970s, China never really had a Foreign Policy to East Asia, in the last decade it started a kind of regional policy. I’ll explain the driving forces China is adopting in its behavior towards East Asia. Some of those driving forces are economy, security, bilateral and multilateral relationship, and also cultural and ideological principles.

Yingjie Guo
From All-Under-Heaven to Nation-State:

China’s entry into the modern era has been commonly characterized in terms of a ‘contraction from a world to a nation in the world’, a transition from culturalism to nationalism, or a shift ‘from cultural entity to political entity’. Obviously these characterizations are analogies or loose paradigms at best and have no single source or definitive formulation. As such they are not to be taken too literally or accepted unquestioningly. In fact, there is good reason to believe that China is a continental system rather than a nation-state, that ‘a fundamental problem in China’s modernisation is that China is really a civilisation pretending to be a nation-state’, that China remains a ‘nationless state’ despite all the nationalist rhetoric of the last century.

This paper looks at some of the major implications and effects of China’s transformation, particularly its challenge to, and impact on, the age-old cosmopolitan Chineseness as the diversity and inherent variety of ‘all under Heaven’ (tianxia). On this basis, it argues that the weakness of the ‘Chinese nation’ and the poverty of ‘Chinese nationalism’ are related to the Chinese Party-state’s longstanding practice of subordinating the nation to the state and the prevalent assumption that social diversity and various forms of particularity must be suppressed, as these are obstacles to state-building or modernisation, or both. In consequence, the state predominates in what is presumably a ‘nation-state’, whereas the nation becomes something represented in mute acquiescence by the state as it is subsumed under the nation-state.